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ABSTRACT 
This Comment explores the intersection between trademarks and the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause.  The thesis is that trademarks—an intellectual 
property regime caught between its competing aims of protecting consumers and 
bolstering the rights of trademark owners—currently focuses heavily on the lat-
ter and consequently amounts to constitutionally protected private property.  
To this end, the Comment argues that trademarks are both legal private prop-
erty and constitutionally protected property for purposes of the Takings Clause.  
Further, the Comment examines potential obstacles and applications of a 
trademark takings doctrine and concludes that, because the "propertization" of 
trademarks under the Lanham Act is unlikely to be reined in, courts and 
scholars should endeavor to fashion workable solutions to the trademark tak-
ings issue.  The realization that trademarks are constitutional property serves 
to clarify the present broad scope of the trademark property right and, addi-
tionally, sheds new light on intangible takings jurisprudence. 
INTRODUCTION 
To begin, consider the following three scenarios as they relate to 
the intersection between the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution and the law of trademarks:1 
(1) The Ringling Bros. circus company brings suit under the fed-
eral Trademark (Lanham) Act statute2 claiming that its trademarked 
phrase “The Greatest Show on Earth” is being infringed and diluted 
by the federal government’s similar phrase “The Greatest Snow on 
Earth,” which the government uses to advertise the U.S. Winter 
 
  J.D., 2012, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Special thanks to Professor Shyam 
Balganesh for his helpful comments and guidance on earlier drafts and to the staff of the 
Journal of Constitutional Law for their work throughout the editing process. 
 1 This Comment uses the term “trademark” broadly to encompass also service marks, trade 
dress, and trade names. 
 2 Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2006).  The Lanham Act is 
the primary federal trademark statute in the United States.  See discussion infra Part I.C. 
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Olympics team.3  This use of the phrase by the federal government is 
a possible per se “trademark taking.”4 
(2) A well-known food manufacturer, Kellogg Company, brings 
suit against the federal government when the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (“FDA”) drafts a proposal prohibiting products from being 
marketed to children unless food manufacturers adhere to strict nu-
tritional guidelines.5  The proposal defines “marketing to children” in 
a way that restricts product packaging design and use of animated 
characters, including Kellogg’s well-known mascot, Tony the Tiger.  If 
enacted, the legal result of the proposal would be that the packaging 
of products which fail to meet the stringent nutritional guidelines re-
quired must be vastly altered, and the use of Tony the Tiger would be 
prohibited.  The packaging changes and mascot loss would result in a 
negative impact upon Kellogg’s stock prices and market health.  This 
restrictive government regulation is a potential regulatory trademark 
taking.6 
(3) Assume that the proposed law is enacted in the scenario di-
rectly above.  A state appellate court affirms the dismissal of Kellogg’s 
claim and holds that no government taking of a trademark occurred.  
The U.S. Supreme Court reverses the decision, and explains that the 
state appellate court erroneously applied the Takings Clause to the 
case.  Ruling for Kellogg’s, it invalidates the state court decision and 
holds that the government regulation did, in fact, constitute a taking 
of Kellogg’s trademark.  The state appellate court’s erroneous ruling 
is a hypothetical example of a judicial trademark taking—because the 
appellate court ruling, by not ordering that “just compensation” be 
 
 3 This scenario is based on Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Divi-
sion of Travel Development, 955 F. Supp. 605, 608–09 (E.D. Va. 1997).  While the facts were 
changed in the scenario to reflect federal government use, the actual case revolved 
around Utah’s use of the slogan to promote the State’s winter tourism industry.  Id. at 
610–11.  The court examined Ringling Bros.’ dilution claim and found that neither blur-
ring nor tarnishment had occurred, as the circus could not show any loss of its mark’s 
profitability as a result of the State’s slogan.  Id. at 616, 621.  Further, surveys showed that 
the State’s mark was nearly unknown outside of Utah.  Id. at 617.  Because there was no 
trademark infringement or dilution found, id. at 622, the court had no reason to, and did 
not, discuss whether the government’s slogan implicated the Takings Clause.  The facts 
were altered to reflect potential federal, as opposed to state, infringement due to state 
sovereign immunity laws set forth in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. 
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630–31 (1999). 
 4 See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 5 See Joseph J. Lewczak & Angela M. Bozzuti, Will Federal Food Ad “Guidelines” Tread on Brand 
Trademarks?, 20 LEGAL OPINION LETTER, no. 21 (Wash. Legal Found., Washington, D.C.), 
Oct. 21, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.wlf.org/publishing/publication_detail. 
asp?id=2274. 
 6 See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
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paid as a result of the regulation, was the mechanism that led to the 
taking of Kellogg’s brand value.7 
Do the facts in any or all of the above scenarios trigger the Tak-
ings Clause?  This Comment proposes that each could be considered 
what this author labels a trademark taking—an action of the state 
that results in the seizure of a private trademark property right.  Ac-
cordingly, a taking of a trademark might come to involve a per se tak-
ing,8 a regulatory taking,9 or perhaps, under the doctrine created by 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Stop the Beach Renourish-
ment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, a judicial taking.10 
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause states, “nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”11  Tak-
ings jurisprudence has been referred to as a “muddle”—the doctrines 
used to interpret the Takings Clause are difficult to ascertain and al-
ways evolving.12  A particular area of uncertainty, referred to by one 
scholar as the “muddle within the muddle,”13 is whether intellectual 
 
 7 See discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
 8 See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) 
(explaining the distinction between per se and regulatory takings), reh’g en banc denied, 
464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 
(Fed. Cir. 2012); see also discussion infra Part I.A.1. 
 9 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (“The Court . . . has identi-
fied several factors that should be taken into account when determining whether a gov-
ernmental action has gone beyond ‘regulation’ and effects a ‘taking.’  Among those fac-
tors are:  ‘the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its 
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.’” (quoting PruneYard 
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)); see also discussion infra Part I.A.2. 
 10 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 
(2010) (holding that if a court declares that what was an established piece of property no 
longer exists, it has taken property for purposes of the Takings Clause); see also discussion 
infra Part I.A.3. 
 11 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 12 For a sample of the discussions regarding the muddled nature of Takings Clause juris-
prudence, see Jane B. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart of the Takings Muddle:  Kelo, 
Lingle, and Public Discourse About Private Property, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613, 618 (2007) 
(arguing that in upholding broad exercise of eminent domain powers, the Court may 
have paradoxically made it more difficult for state and local governments to exercise 
such powers); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed:  Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 562 (1984) (exploring the elusiveness of the meanings of the word 
“taking” in the law); Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through?:  Takings Jurisprudence Meets 
the Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 847 (1997) (“To go beyond these 
per se [takings] rules . . . may be to substitute judicial activism, based on one metaphysi-
cal theory or another, for the outcome of an open and fair political process.”). 
 13 Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 
FLA. L. REV. 529, 529 (1998) (“If the law of takings as applied to real and personal prop-
erty is the ‘muddle’ that many commentators insist it is, the law of taking with regard to 
intellectual property can only be characterized as a muddle within the muddle.”). 
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property rights14—patents, trade secrets, copyrights, and trade-
marks—are constitutionally protected private property under the Takings 
Clause.15  The debate has mainly focused on patents and trade secrets 
so far:  Somewhat recently, in Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III), 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit16 stated that patents, de-
spite being considered “private property interests,” are not constitu-
tional property under the Takings Clause.17  Years earlier, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, that trade secrets are 
protected.18  Whether trademarks are secured under the Fifth 
Amendment, though, has not been examined thoroughly.19 
 
 14 Intellectual property is a form of the broader term “intangible property.”  The terms, 
however, are often used interchangeably in this Comment to refer to intellectual proper-
ty rights—trademarks, copyrights, patents, and trade secrets. 
 15 For examples of the disagreement between academics on this point, compare DAVID A. 
DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY:  TAKINGS 228–53 (2002) (arguing that although 
“[a]pplication of the Takings Clause to intellectual property—trademarks, copyrights 
and patents—has not yet been seriously tested in the courts,” there are other possible ap-
plications of existing legal rules to the concept of takings of intangible rights) with Shub-
ha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property:  The Path Left Open 
After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637, 667 (2000) (claiming 
that application of the Takings Clause to “intellectual property or intangible property 
would occur only through analogy” (emphasis added)) and Adam Mossoff, Patents as Con-
stitutional Private Property:  The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 
B.U. L. REV. 689, 693 (2007) (arguing that nineteenth-century federal court jurispru-
dence applied the Takings Clause to patents but has been eclipsed by modern courts and 
scholars). 
 16 A Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decision regarding patents is particularly influential as 
compared with decisions of other appellate courts, as the Federal Circuit has per se juris-
diction over patent appeals when a federal patent issue is raised in the plaintiff’s initial 
complaint, as it was in Zoltek.  See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 
535 U.S. 826, 838–39 (2002) (clarifying the rules regarding the Federal Circuit’s patent 
jurisdiction). 
 17 See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) 
(holding that when the government uses a patented invention, it does not “take” any 
property interest that belongs to the patent owner), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 
De Graffenried v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 384, 387 (Fed. Cl. 1993).  But see Festo Corp. 
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002) (noting that patent 
owners have, borrowing a factor from takings jurisprudence, “the legitimate expectations 
of inventors in their property”). 
 18 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013 (1984). 
 19 Few scholarly articles have been written that touch on this area.  See Abraham Bell, Private 
Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 563 (2009) (discussing takings by only non-governmental 
actors, mentioning trademark and domain name private takings); Sam Foster Halabi, In-
ternational Trademark Protection and Global Public Health:  A Just-Compensation Regime for Ex-
propriations and Regulatory Takings, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 325, 331 (2012) (arguing “that 
trademarks are better characterized as property,” but only in the context of “public-
health and consumer protection regulation”); Susan Eisenberg, Note, Intangible Takings, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 667, 670–671 (2007) (focusing on when “an intangible interest becomes 
compensable ‘private property’ under the Fifth Amendment” but only with regard to 
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This Comment, as such, discusses how trademarks intersect with 
the Takings Clause.20  Trademark law has broadened significantly 
since the advent of the Lanham Act.21  The expansion of trademark 
doctrine is focused, first and foremost, on the protection of business 
goodwill.22  This “propertization” of the trademark regime,23 together 
with constitutional property dimensions favorable to trademark law, 
supports the claim that trademarks ought to be subject to the Takings 
Clause. 
The issue is relevant because the scope of trademarks and takings 
has expanded.  As trademark doctrine has focused more on securing 
mark owners’ brand values—relegating its more widely recognized 
goal of consumer protection to mere pretext—there is debate regard-
ing the primary role of trademarks.24  Moreover, larger overlap be-
tween takings and trademarks is bound to occur as both the Lanham 
Act and takings jurisprudence continue to grow.25  Indeed, an under-
 
“entity locators” such as “phone numbers, domain names, screen names, and email ad-
dresses” (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20 The issue of copyright’s application to the Takings Clause is also relatively unexplored.  
However, the fact that copyrights are a federally created right makes it quite easy to anal-
ogize copyrights to patents using the reasoning in Zoltek, where the court held that be-
cause patents are “creatures of federal law” and not created by “an independent source 
such as state law,” they cannot be protected under the Takings Clause.  Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 
1352.  On the other hand, trademark law—although codified under the federal Lanham 
Act—has state common-law origins.  See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984) (stating that the “kinship” existing between patent law and 
copyright law does not exist between copyright law and trademark law). 
 21 See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2100–01 
(2004) (arguing that “trademark law has expanded over the past few decades” and as-
pects of this expansion, particularly in the field of “trade dress,” makes it “difficult to 
square with an account that assumes trademarks are solely devices for delivering product 
information to consumers”); Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 413, 427 (2010) (discussing “trademark law’s expansion beyond competing 
products”); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2007) (noting that trademark law originally “sought to protect 
producers from illegitimate diversions of their trade by competitors” and has continued 
to expand in this direction); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion:  Standing at the 
Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 189–90 (2005) (acknowledging, but 
disapproving of, the “expansion of trademarks in recent years”). 
 22 McKenna, supra note 21, at 1916 (“[M]odern trademark law is industrial policy intended 
to protect brand value.”). 
 23 Id. at 1847. 
 24 Id. at 1915 (“Strong marks have been the obvious—and intended—beneficiaries of ex-
panded protection, as trademark law has aimed to reserve to mark owners the entire val-
ue of ‘their’ marks.”); see also Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American 
Trademark Law:  A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 911 (2000) 
(arguing that the expansion of trademark law in favor of trademark owners has created a 
“new property” in trademarks). 
 25 This is not to say that claimants have not already on occasion brought trademark taking 
claims to court, but rather that they have been largely ignored by judges.  For example, in 
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standing of the scope of trademark law and its intersection with the 
Takings Clause will help to clarify the current dimensions of trade-
marks as property, as well as shed new light on intangible takings ju-
risprudence. 
The thesis of this Comment is that, for better or worse,26 trade-
marks are constitutionally protected, private property27 under the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Part I provides background 
information regarding the Takings Clause, intangible property, and 
trademark law.  Part II proceeds in two stages:  First, this Part devel-
ops the idea that trademarks—despite claims that they are based in 
tort and exist mainly for the benefit of consumers—grant distinct 
property rights to mark owners.  Second, it makes the claim that 
trademarks are—in addition to private property—constitutional 
property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.  In Part III, this 
Comment describes a potential trademark takings doctrine and con-
cludes by discussing examples of per se, regulatory, and judicial tak-
ings of trademarks. 
Finally, it is significant that after College Savings Bank v. Florida Pre-
paid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, trademark takings claims 
against state governments are exceedingly convoluted (if not barred 
entirely) due to the Supreme Court’s ruling that states hold sovereign 
 
Singer Management Consultants v. Milgram, 608 F. Supp. 2d 607 (D.N.J. 2009), plaintiffs—a 
musical group with an unregistered trademark in the name “Elsbeary Hobbs Drifters”—
alleged that enforcement of the legislation called the “Truth in Music Act effects a taking 
of the Plaintiffs’ property rights in their unregistered trademarks without compensation” 
because the act “prevents holders of unregistered but valid trademarks from causing their 
musical groups to perform, to be promoted and to speak.”  Id. at 608–09.  The case was 
dismissed for unrelated reasons, and the taking claim was not addressed by the court.  Id. 
at 614–15. 
 26 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999) (arguing that “recent developments threaten to stretch the ra-
tionale of trademark law beyond all limits”); McKenna, supra note 21, at 1916 (“There 
may be good reasons for concern about the scope of modern trademark law.  It may be 
interfering excessively with competition.  It may be the result of a particularly serious 
public choice problem.  And even if the goal of protecting brand value is worthy, modern 
doctrines may place unacceptably high burdens on speech.” (footnote omitted)); Roth-
man, supra note 21, at 190 (recognizing that trademarks have moved in a property fo-
cused direction, but arguing that “[t]rademark law was never meant to be a property 
grant to individual trademark holders; rather, the protection of trademarks requires a 
careful balance of the interests of trademark holders, competitors and the public”).  But 
see Michael Pulos, Comment, A Semiotic Solution to the Propertization Problem of Trademark, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 833 (2006) (arguing that the propertization critique of trademark law is 
not wholly accurate).  This Comment, though, makes no opinion of the broad scope of 
trademark law.  Instead, it seeks to explore the ramifications of that scope. 
 27 In this Comment, the two elements of trademark will be referred to separately:  “Private 
property” and “constitutional property.”  For explanations of private property and consti-
tutional property, see discussion infra Parts I.B.I and I.B.II. 
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immunity from such claims.28  The federal government, however, has 
waived its immunity from Lanham Act claims under the Tucker Act.29  
Accordingly, this Comment concentrates on trademark takings claims 
involving the federal government rather than claims concerning state 
governments.30 
II.  BACKGROUND:  TAKINGS, INTANGIBLE PROPERTY, AND TRADEMARKS 
This Part provides background information on aspects of general 
takings law.  It then establishes a framework with which to analyze 
private property and constitutional property with respect to the Tak-
ings Clause as it applies to intellectual property rights.  Lastly, this 
Part discusses relevant trademark law principles. 
A.  Takings Law 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is comprised of 
two clauses—the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause—each 
designed to protect citizens from undue government interference.31  
The Due Process Clause prescribes that any deprivation of “life, liber-
ty, or property” requires “due process of law.”32  While the Due Pro-
cess Clause is relevant to the government acquisition of private intel-
lectual property,33 this Comment seeks to explore only trademark 
law’s intersection with the Takings Clause. 
The Takings Clause imposes two restrictions on the government’s 
ability to take individuals’ property.  It requires the government to 
 
 28 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 
(1999) (holding that states hold sovereign immunity with regards to trademark, as well as 
other intangible, taking claims). 
 29 The United States government, through the Tucker Act, has waived its sovereign immun-
ity with respect to several constitutional claims, including Fifth Amendment taking 
claims.  See Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006) (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims shall 
have jurisdiction to render judgment upon . . . rights in tangible or intangible proper-
ty.”). 
 30 While it may be possible to circumvent the issue of sovereign immunity in regards to state 
trademark taking claims, this is beyond the scope of this Comment.  For an analysis of 
sovereign immunity and intellectual property takings issues, see Ghosh, supra note 15 
(analyzing whether an infringement of intellectual property rights by a state government 
constitutes a regulatory taking). 
 31 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 32 Id. 
 33 For an analysis of due process and its relationship with intellectual property issues, see 
Davida A. Isaacs, Shifting Constitutional Sands:  Can and Should Patentholders Rely on the Due 
Process Clause to Thwart Government Action?, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 627 (2008) (analyzing 
patentholders’ right to due process protection using the test applied to determine the 
rights of recipients of other government benefits). 
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take property only for “public use,” and to pay “just compensation” 
for property it has taken.34  The government is obligated to pay a 
property owner “just compensation” when (1) an actor of the state, 
(2) authorized by law, (3) takes (4) an individual’s private property 
(5) for a public use or benefit.35  The goal of compensable takings is 
to allow the government to take citizens’ private property, but also to 
“make whole again” the owner forced to give up the property.  The 
Takings Clause also serves to constrain government takings by impos-
ing on it a fiscal burden.36 
A significant development in takings jurisprudence involves the 
widening of the “public use” language in the Takings Clause to en-
compass “public purpose.”  In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme 
Court held that property may be transferred from one private actor 
to another private actor for a “public purpose.”37  Despite the seem-
ingly private transfer at issue,38 the public purpose embraced by the 
Court was economic growth.39  The reasoning used by the Supreme 
Court and the effects of the decision are controversial.40  Neverthe-
less, the Kelo decision is noteworthy for considerably broadening the 
“public use” requirement to include public purposes.41 
 
 34 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 35 See Cotter, supra note 13, at 535 (stating the elements of a taking claim). 
 36 See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1373 (Fed Cir. 2006) (Plager, J. dissent-
ing) (“By requiring just compensation the Constitution makes the property owner whole, 
and it also places a constraint on government action by imposing the cost of such action 
on the Government’s fisc, thus subjecting administrative action to the discipline of public 
decision-making and legislative authorization.”), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 
(Fed. Cir. 2006), vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 37 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005) (holding that the benefit a 
community gains from economic growth is sufficient to satisfy the public use language in 
the Takings Clause). 
 38 Kelo involved an attempt by the City of New London to purchase 115 houses in an urban 
area in order to sell them to commercial developers.  Id. at 474–75.  This was done to 
take advantage of increased jobs and tax revenues that drug company Pfizer’s new plant 
would bring to the area.  Id.  When several residents resisted, the city used its eminent 
domain power to claim the land.  Id. at 475. 
 39 Id. at 489–90. 
 40 See, e.g., Orlando E. Delogu, Kelo v. City of New London—Wrongly Decided and A Missed 
Opportunity for Principled Line Drawing with Respect to Eminent Domain Takings, 58 ME. L. 
REV. 17, 20 (2006) (“When one looks at the larger project area in Kelo, there is no indica-
tion in the record that any of the properties acquired by the New London Development 
Corporation (whether by condemnation or market transaction) were in a ‘rundown,’ 
‘slum,’ or ‘blighted’ condition, or that any such designation hung over the neighborhood 
as a whole.”); Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand:  Economic Development Takings After 
Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 271 (2007) (noting that the “political reaction against 
the Kelo decision may yet result in the enactment of at least some useful legislative re-
strictions on eminent domain at either the state or federal level”). 
 41 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488–90. 
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After Kelo, there exist two public use categories:  First, the gov-
ernment may transfer ownership of property from private to public 
hands.42  Second, the government may transfer property from one 
private owner to another private owner, provided (1) the later private 
owner makes the property available for public use, or (2) the transfer 
is for a purpose involving the public good, as was the situation in Ke-
lo.43 
Seizures of property under the Takings Clause may be considered 
per se takings, regulatory takings, or judicial takings.  The following 
Subparts briefly describe each category. 
1.  Per Se Takings 
The most straightforward government taking is a per se (total) 
taking.  Courts have found per se takings when (1) a physical gov-
ernmental appropriation of a property for its own use occurs44 or (2) 
when a regulation constitutes a complete deprivation of all use or 
value of property.45 
A physical taking is a government-sanctioned physical occupation 
of property.46  A physical appropriation by the government involves 
the acquisition of an individual’s private property for the governe-
ment’s own use.47  For example, imagine that the federal government 
seeks to take measures to prevent deforestation.  Therefore, through 
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the government cre-
 
 42 See U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 43 For a historical overview and analysis of the public use requirement before and after Kelo, 
see Brent Nicholson & Sue Ann Mota, From Public Use to Public Purpose:  The Supreme Court 
Stretches the Takings Clause in Kelo v. City of New London, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 81 (2005). 
 44 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) 
(holding that a “permanent physical occupation of property is a taking”). 
 45 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (“Where the State 
seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think 
it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the 
owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin 
with.”). 
 46 See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Plager, J., dis-
senting) (explaining the distinction between per se and regulatory takings in the context 
of intellectual property), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), vacated 
in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426–27 (ex-
plaining that the Court will find a taking in instances of a “permanent physical occupa-
tion”). 
 47 Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1373–74 (Plager, J., dissenting) (“In recent years the Supreme Court 
has extended the salutary protection of the Fifth Amendment to excessive governmental 
regulation—the ‘regulatory taking’ issue—in addition to the traditional takings area in 
which the government actually acquires private property interests for its own use—the 
‘[per se] taking’ issue.”). 
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ates a new national park and designates the entire area as govern-
ment property.  In the process, it forces a number of property owners 
in the area to relinquish their land.  The federal government has the 
authority under its Fifth Amendment eminent domain power to take 
this land for the public use of environmental restoration, provided 
that it monetarily compensates those whose property it has taken as 
part of the project. 
The type of regulation that results in a complete deprivation of 
property value is also considered a per se taking.  In Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court held that a regulation, 
even if temporary, that deprives an owner of all use or value of an in-
dividual’s real property nearly always constitutes a taking.48  The gov-
ernmental regulation at issue in Lucas prevented the petitioner from 
building any homes on his beachfront property.49  This effectively de-
prived him of “all economically beneficial” uses of his land and was 
thus considered by the Court to constitute a taking.50 
2.  Regulatory Takings 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Supreme 
Court extended the protections of the Takings Clause to encompass 
regulatory takings.51  A (non-per se) regulatory taking is one in which 
a government regulation interferes with the use or enjoyment of 
one’s private property.52  A three-factor balancing test is used in the 
determination of whether a government regulation amounts to a tak-
ing.  The factors considered are (1) “the character of the governmen-
tal action,” (2) the governmental action’s “economic impact,” and 
(3) the governmental action’s “interference with reasonable invest-
 
 48 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011–12, 1015–16 (arguing that a regulation that denies all economi-
cally beneficial uses of land constitutes a taking and citing to the proposition that tempo-
rary deprivations of use are compensable). 
 49 Id. at 1006–07. 
 50 Id. at 1031–32 (holding that the state has committed a taking unless it can show a com-
mon law principle that would legally bar petitioner’s desired use of his land). 
 51 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (concluding that no 
regulatory taking was effected because the “restrictions imposed are substantially related 
to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of 
the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not only 
the Terminal site proper but also other properties”). 
 52 See id. at 124 (explaining that a taking is more likely to be found “when the interference 
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government than when inter-
ference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of econom-
ic life to promote the common good” (citation omitted)). 
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ment-backed expectations.”53  A regulation, however, that deprives 
the owner of a profitable use of her property may not constitute a tak-
ing if other factors dictate against such a finding.54 
For example, the Court in Penn Central held that no taking had 
occurred.  The government regulation in question—a restriction on 
the ability to build on top of the railroad terminal for the purpose of 
preserving the building as a historical landmark—did not significant-
ly interfere with Penn Central’s “reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectation”55 to profit from utilizing its building as a railroad termi-
nal.56 
3.  Judicial Takings 
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded takings jurispru-
dence to include judicial takings.  The judicial takings doctrine was 
developed in the Supreme Court’s Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. 
Florida Department of Environmental Protection opinion.  In Stop the Beach, 
Justice Scalia held that if “a court declares that what was once an es-
tablished right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that 
property, no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or 
destroyed its value by regulation.”57  Several scholars have broached 
the subject, but the scope of the judicial takings doctrine remains un-
clear.58 
 
 53 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (citing PruneYard Shopping 
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)) (describing the regulatory takings test factors). 
 54 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005–06 (finding that a party’s lack of reasonable, investment-
backed expectations disposed of the central taking question). 
 55 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83. 
 56 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 (“The restrictions . . . not only permit reasonable beneficial 
use of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not 
only the Terminal site proper but also other properties.”). 
 57 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 
(2010) (emphasis omitted). 
 58 See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 903, 
904, 919 (2011) (noting the complexity of judicial takings and arguing that judicial tak-
ings should apply to government actions that mandate transfers of private property to 
public ownership, but not to government actions that mandate transfers of property be-
tween private persons); Richard A. Epstein, Littoral Rights Under the Takings Doctrine:  The 
Clash Between the Ius Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment, 6 DUKE J. OF CONST. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 37, 40, 67–71 (2011) (arguing that judicial takings “should be limited to 
those circumstances in which the decided cases make a radical break from well-
established common-law patterns that systematically work for the advantage of the state 
or some identifiable private faction”); Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Ju-
dicial Takings or Due Process?,  97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 364–67 (2012) (discussing possible 
interpretations of the judicial takings doctrine); Ilya Shapiro & Trevor Burrus, Judicial 
Takings and Scalia’s Shifting Sands, 35 VT. L. REV. 423, 424 (2010) (arguing that “the judi-
cial takings doctrine is necessary to a robust constitutional protection of property 
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B.  Intangible Private Property and Constitutional Property 
The Takings Clause is most often applied to real property.59  
There is no bar to applying the Takings Clause to intangible (or per-
sonal) property, however.60  One problem with attempted application, 
though, stems from the difficulty inherent in deciding which intangi-
bles constitute protected property under the Fifth Amendment. 
It may appear obvious that privately owned “intellectual property” 
is “property,” but, despite the semantic likeness of the terms, this is 
not always true.  Accordingly, in order for an intellectual property 
right to be afforded protection under the Takings Clause, it must be 
(1) a private legal property interest that (2) is constitutionally pro-
tected.61 
1.  Intellectual Property as Legal Private Property 
The first step in deciding whether a form of intellectual property 
is property for purposes of the Takings Clause is addressing whether 
such a right is, in the legal sense, a private property interest.  Property 
may be tangible or intangible,62 but the simple fact that a thing is 
property in name (i.e. “intellectual property”) does not make it a legal 
private property interest. 
In normative terms, property is often referred to as a “bundle of 
rights.”63  The “right to exclude” is widely considered the most im-
 
rights”); Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem of Judicial Takings, 6 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 91, 100–06 (2011) (discussing the difficulties that a judi-
cial takings doctrine would present for federal courts). 
 59 See Cotter, supra note 13, at 536 (“By far the vast majority of Supreme Court decisions 
concerning takings have arisen in response to governmental actions involving real, as 
opposed to personal or intangible, property.”). 
 60 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) (holding that intangible 
property rights, such as trade secrets, may be protected under the Fifth Amendment and 
noting that other intangible property interests such as liens and contracts are intangible). 
 61 See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) 
(finding that although patents are private property interests, they are not constitutional 
property under the Fifth Amendment, and therefore they are not subject to the Takings 
Clause), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), vacated in part, 672 F.3d 
1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 62 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003 (noting that property “extends beyond land and tangible 
goods and includes the products of an individual’s ‘labour and invention’” (citing 2 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405)). 
 63 The bundle of rights theory is usually attributed to the work of the jurist and pioneering 
property scholar, Wesley Hohfeld, though Hohfeld never used the metaphor himself.  See 
WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL 
REASONING 72–73 (David Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., 2001) (making an argument 
that can be generalized as the bundle of rights theory, that rights in rem are actually a 
collection of in personam rights against everyone under a duty to respect them, one of 
 
May 2013] TRADEMARK TAKINGS 1593 
 
portant right in the bundle.64  Thomas Merrill, a prominent property 
scholar, has declared that the “sine qua non” of property is the right 
to exclude.65  Another respected scholar has argued that “the right to 
property should be conceived of as the right to exclusive use.”66  The 
courts also speak often of property in the context of an owner’s “right 
to exclude everyone else” from interfering with the thing in ques-
tion.67 
Additionally, courts have defined property interests as “assignable” 
and—in invoking John Locke’s labor theory68—“the products of an 
individual’s ‘labour and invention.’”69  Further, courts have held that 
a property interest is “the right to possess, use, and dispose of” a 
thing.70  In a practical sense, property means that someone possesses a 
right in a thing that will be recognized and upheld by the courts.71 
Even if an intellectual property right is considered a legal proper-
ty interest, it does not automatically qualify for protection under the 
 
which can be discharged without the rest of the property rights being extinguished).  
The bundle of rights theory, while often criticized, remains a centerpiece of property 
theory.  See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1191–
94 (1999) (tracing the history of the theory); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Consti-
tutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 899 (2000) (explaining that property is often con-
ceived to be a “bundle of rights”); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 711, 713 n.8 (1996) (tracing the history of the “bundle of sticks” metaphor 
as it relates to property theory). 
 64 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (“We have repeatedly 
held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, ‘the right to exclude [oth-
ers is] one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly charac-
terized as property.” (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 
419, 433 (1982))(internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citation omitted)).  
 65 Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998). 
 66 J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 103 (1997). 
 67 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (analyzing the right to 
exclude in the context of a regulatory taking); United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 280, 
282–83 (2002) (analyzing the right to exclude in the context of a tax dispute); Coll. Sav. 
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672—73 (1999) 
(analyzing the right to exclude in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 68 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 14–26 (J. W. Gough ed., 
1946). 
 69 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (quoting 2 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405). 
 70 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 986 (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 
377–78 (1945)). 
 71 See In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501–02 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (“To say one 
has a ‘trademark’ implies ownership and ownership implies the right to exclude others.  
If the law will not protect one’s claim of right to exclude others from using an alleged 
trademark, then he does not own a ‘trademark,’ for that which all are free to use cannot 
be a trademark.”); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2:14, 2-38 (4th ed. 2012) (“‘Ownership’ means that one possesses a right 
that will be recognized and upheld in the courts.”). 
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Takings Clause.  This was exemplified when the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit held that patents are property, yet still fail to qual-
ify as constitutional property under the Fifth Amendment.72  Accord-
ingly, for purposes of takings analysis, it is necessary to evaluate 
whether a legal private property interest meets the criteria necessary 
for constitutional protection. 
2.  Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property 
After establishing that one has a private property interest in intel-
lectual property, the second question to ask is whether such an inter-
est is constitutional property for purposes of the Takings Clause.  The 
definition of constitutional property differs between the Takings 
Clause and the Due Process Clause.73  This Comment speaks of con-
stitutional property only as it applies to the former.74  Unfortunately, 
there are no clear tests for determining whether an intellectual prop-
erty interest is considered constitutional property.  This uncertainty 
results in confusion and unpredictability.  Nevertheless, the courts 
have given some guidance on the matter. 
Just as the right to exclude is vital to the normative evaluation of 
private property, it is also necessary as to whether a property right is 
considered constitutional property.  In addressing the applicability of 
Takings Clause protections to intellectual property rights, the Su-
preme Court has held that the right to exclude others is a “hallmark” 
of constitutional property.75  Property scholars tend to agree with this 
position too—most embrace the right to exclude conception of 
property as the theoretical gold standard.76 
 
 72 See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) 
(holding that patents do not constitute property under the Takings Clause), reh’g en banc 
denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 73 Merrill, supra note 63, at 955–60 (contrasting the definitions of “property” under the 
Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause). 
 74 For a discussion on constitutional property as related to the Due Process Clause, see Joel 
Hugenberger, Note, Redefining Property Under the Due Process Clause:  Town of Castle Rock 
v. Gonzales and the Demise of the Positive Law Approach, 47 B.C. L. REV. 773 (2006). 
 75 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 666, 673 
(1999) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.  
That is ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly charac-
terized as property.’” (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))); 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (explaining 
that the “power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured 
strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights”). 
 76 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude:  Of Property, Inviolability, 
and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 593 (2008) (“The right to ex-
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The origin of the property interest is also a significant factor in 
considering constitutional property.  The Supreme Court has stated 
that “[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution.  Ra-
ther, they are created and their dimensions defined by existing rules 
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as 
state law.”77  Moreover, the Federal Circuit, in Zoltek,78 held that be-
cause patents are created by federal statutes—and would not exist but 
for the U.S. Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause—they are not 
constitutional property.79 
Additionally, the Federal Circuit explained that historically, courts 
had declined to protect patents under the Fifth Amendment.  There-
fore, precedent dictates that patent owners should not have settled 
expectations of constitutional property rights in their patents.80 
Some principles can be extrapolated from the aforementioned il-
lustrations.  First, the right to exclude as a normative property justifi-
cation is central not only to the determination of whether an intellec-
tual property right is a property interest, but also as to whether that 
property interest is, constitutionally, property.  Second, an intellectu-
al property right must be created by state law (or some “independent 
 
clude has long been considered a central component of property.”); Merrill, supra note 
63, at 970 (arguing that the right to exclude should be the most important factor in de-
termining constitutional property); Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude:  Public Ac-
commodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1301 (1996) (“When asked to 
define private property, many judges, scholars, casebook authors, and law students focus 
on the right to exclude.”). 
 77 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (quoting Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)). 
 78 While the Zoltek opinion was later partially vacated and reversed due to reasons beyond 
the scope of this Comment, the reversal had nothing to do with the patent takings issue, 
which has firm historical backing and likely remains good law.  See Zoltek Corp. v. United 
States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (com-
menting on the order vacating the lower court’s decision on takings jurisprudence:  “This 
theory of liability is not even tangentially related to Zoltek’s claims against Lockheed, and 
has no relationship whatsoever to the transfer order”); see also Demodulation, Inc. v. 
United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 794, 809 (2012) (following Zoltek, before it was remanded); 
Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 172 (1894) (holding that a government con-
tractor’s use of a patented process is not a taking, as the government is not “now in pos-
session or enjoyment of anything embraced within the patent”). 
 79 See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1352 (explaining that patents are “creature[s] of federal law” and 
that Congress chose not to create them as constitutional property). 
 80 See id. at 1350 (citing Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 169) (holding that there is no constitutional 
property right in a patent).  The judicial history of trademark law, however, dictates no 
such bar regarding the settled expectations of trademark owners.  See McKenna, supra 
note 21, at 1860–63 (detailing the ways in which both American and English courts have 
used trademark law to protect the interests of producers); see also discussion infra Part 
II.B.3 (discussing how trademarks theoretically fall under the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment). 
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source” other than the Constitution) for it to be protected.81  Third, 
prior precedent and “settled expectations” are considered in the 
evaluation of whether an intellectual property right is protected un-
der the Takings Clause.82 
In addition to court guidance, scholars have contributed to consti-
tutional property analysis.  Professor Merrill explains in his article, 
The Landscape of Constitutional Property, that the theoretical dimensions 
should consist of “an irrevocable right . . . to exclude others from 
specific [or discrete] assets.”83  Separated into elements, Merrill’s def-
inition suggests that constitutional property must:  (1) be considered 
an irrevocable right, (2) consist of discrete assets, and (3) contain the 
right to exclude.84  In Part II, this Comment draws from both the 
courts’ reasoning and Merrill’s scholarly analysis in determining that 
trademarks are constitutional property. 
C.  Trademark Law 
While sometimes referred to otherwise, trademarks are legal pri-
vate property,85 industrial property,86 and intellectual property.87  In-
tellectual property rights such as trademarks, copyrights, and patents 
are exceptions to the “public domain.”88  An invention, idea, writing, 
or symbol that is in the public domain may be freely copied—it is not 
 
 81 This Comment does not speculate regarding “independent sources” beyond state law. 
 82 See, e.g., Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350–53 (discussing prior precedent in concluding that patent 
infringement did not constitute a constitutional taking). 
 83 Merrill, supra note 63, at 969.  This set of criteria is purely theoretical and has not so far 
been utilized by the courts. 
 84 See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
 85 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 70, § 2:20, at 2-41 (“There is no doubt that good will, togeth-
er with its symbol—the trademark—are legally classified as ‘property.’”). 
 86 WORLD INT’L PROP. ORG., UNDERSTANDING INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 4–5, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/intproperty/895/wipo_pub_895.pdf (explain-
ing that “[i]ntellectual property is usually divided into two branches, namely industrial 
property and copyright” and that “[i]ndustrial property . . . covers trademarks, service 
marks, layout-designs of integrated circuits, commercial names and designations, as well 
as geographical indications, and protection against unfair competition” (citing Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 1(3), Mar. 20, 1883, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html#P71_4054)). 
 87 See McKenna, supra note 21; 1 MCCARTHY supra note 71, § 1:3, at 1-7 (“The most im-
portant areas of the exclusive rights of intellectual property are the trilogy of patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks.” (footnotes omitted)); id. § 6:4, at 6-7 (noting that patents, 
trademarks, and copyrights “all share the attributes of personal property and are referred 
to en masse as ‘intellectual property’” (footnote omitted)). 
 88 Id. § 1:2, at 1-4 (“Public domain is the general rule:  Intellectual property is the excep-
tion.”). 
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intellectual property.89  This is so because “copying is an essential el-
ement of free competition.”90  While patent law involves functional 
and design inventions in order to encourage investment in new tech-
nology, and copyrights deal with the communication of ideas and in-
formation in tangible form, trademarks protect symbols—often in the 
form of brand names and images.91 
The definition of a trademark is “any word, name, symbol, device 
or any combination thereof—“(1) used by a person, or (2) which a 
person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce . . . to identify 
and distinguish his or her goods [or services in the case of a service 
mark] . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate 
the source of the goods [or services].”92  An owner acquires rights in a 
trademark through use of the mark.93  Priority of use is determined 
between competing users of a mark by determining the “first user” of 
the trademark.94 
While registration is not absolutely essential to the protection or 
use of a mark,95 trademarks and service marks must be registered with 
the federal Patent and Trademark Office in order to gain the full 
spectrum of protections.96  Trademark registrations, unlike limited 
duration patent and copyright registrations, can continue into perpe-
 
 89 See id. (“‘[P]ublic domain’ is the status of an invention, creative work, commercial sym-
bol, or any other creation that is not protected by any form of intellectual property.”). 
 90 Id. § 1:2, at 1-6 (“[I]n many instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and 
products.  In general, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright 
protects an item, it will be subject to copying . . . . [C]opying is not always discouraged or 
disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive economy . . . . [sic] Allowing com-
petitors to copy will have salutary effects in many instances.” (quoting TrafFix Devices, 
Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)(citation omitted))). 
 91 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 6:3, at 6-5 to -6 (discussing the differences between pa-
tents, copyrights, and trademarks). 
 92 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 93 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2)(C) (2006) (requiring an applicant for trademark to certify 
that “the mark is in use in commerce”). 
 94 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 2:9, at 2-21 (“There is a strong desire to protect the 
rights of the first user of the mark.” (quoting Jewel Cos. v. Westhall Co., 413 F. Supp. 994, 
1000 (N.D. Ohio 1976))). 
 95 Unregistered, common-law trademarks may be protected by way of unfair competition 
provisions.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).  Claims of infringement and dilution, however, may 
not be invoked absent registration.  See id. § 1115; see also San Juan Products, Inc. v. San 
Juan Pools, Inc. 849 F.2d 468, 474 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Unlike the registration of a patent, 
a trademark registration of itself does not create the underlying right to exclude. Nor is a 
trademark created by registration. While federal registration triggers certain substantive 
and procedural rights, the absence of federal registration does not unleash the mark to 
public use. The Lanham Act protects unregistered marks as does the common law.”).   
 96 See id. (making registration prima facie evidence of a mark’s validity, and conclusive evi-
dence where the right to use has become incontestable under § 1065). 
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tuity provided that they are renewed every decade.97  A valid trade-
mark registration and a showing of either the trademark’s inherent 
distinctiveness or acquired secondary meaning allows the mark owner 
to pursue various causes of actions in order to protect a mark.98 
The Lanham Act codifies, but also expands on, state common law.  
It contains trademark provisions related to infringement and dilu-
tion.99  Additionally, the Lanham Act contains federal unfair competi-
tion provisions related to false advertising and false designation of 
origin.100 
Infringement and dilution are property-related Lanham Act pro-
visions that require a valid trademark, whereas false advertising and 
false designation of origin are tort causes of action in which a federal 
trademark registration is not required.101  In an infringement cause of 
action, the owner of a trademark may exclude others from using a 
mark that is either the same or confusingly similar to an identical or 
related good or service.102  The Lanham Act also provides a remedy 
for dilution—the loss of a trademark’s distinctive quality as a result of 
a competitor’s “blurring” or “tarnishment” of the mark. 
American trademark law has two policy goals:  (1) the protection 
of trademark owners’ property, and (2) the defense of consumers 
from deception and confusion.103  While the latter is commonly be-
 
 97 Id. § 1059(a). 
 98 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 7–14 (2d Cir. 1976) (de-
tailing trademark distinctiveness and secondary meaning). 
 99 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (c). 
100 Id. § 1125(a)(1)(B). 
101 See id. § 1114 (providing a civil remedy for infringement of a registered mark); id. 
§ 1125(a) (requiring only that a plaintiff “is likely to be damaged” by false advertising or 
designations of origin). 
102 See id. § 1114(1) (granting a civil remedy for use of a “copy, or colorable imitation of any 
registered mark”); id. § 1125(a) (granting a remedy for any representation “likely to 
cause confusion”; Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (noting 
that proof of the likelihood of confusion is required for liability in trademark infringe-
ment causes of action). 
103 H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 2 (1939) (describing the purpose of H.R. 6618); Rothman, supra 
note 21, at 126 (“One [goal] is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in pur-
chasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the 
product which it asks for and wants to get.  [The other goal is to protect a trademark 
owner’s investment] of energy, time and money in presenting to the public the prod-
uct . . . from [the mark’s] misappropriation by pirates and cheats.” (citing S. REP. NO. 79-
1333, at 3 (1946); H.R. REP. NO. 79-2283, at 19 (1946); H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2 (1945); 
H.R. REP. NO. 78-603, at 2 (1943))); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 5:2, at 5-10 (“In 
the author’s opinion, to select as paramount either protection of the trademark property 
or protection of consumers would be to oversimplify the dual goals of trademark law, 
both historical and modern:  the protection of both consumers from deception and con-
fusion AND the protection of the trademark as property.”). 
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lieved to be the primary goal of trademark law, it is actually the for-
mer that has been dominant—both historically and especially in 
more recent times.104 
III.  THE CASE FOR TRADEMARKS AS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 
This Part first claims that trademarks are legal private property.  
Specifically, mark owners hold a property interest in the goodwill un-
derlying their trademarks.  This part then argues that trademarks 
possess the qualities of constitutional property and are therefore sub-
ject to the Takings Clause. 
A.  Trademarks are Private Property 
This Subpart claims that mark owners hold property rights in 
their trademarks.105  First, it presents counterarguments to this claim.  
In order to show that trademarks are in fact property, this Subpart, 
second, distinguishes trademark law from the broader law of unfair 
competition.  Third, it traces the history of trademark law; courts 
have long been concerned with the protection of brand-name good-
will and treated trademarks as mark owners’ property rights.  Fourth, 
this Subpart discusses the modern expansion of trademark law, high-
lighting the fact that each doctrinal expansion has focused not on 
adding protections for consumers, but instead on granting additional 
rights to mark holders.  Fifth, it explores the theoretical structure of 
trademarks and its relationship to the normative foundations of 
property.  Sixth, it is noted that the trademark assignment structure 
and its perpetual life cycle each support the view that trademarks are 
property interests.  Finally, this Subpart concludes by describing 
trademarks as symbolic of businesses’ goodwill and reputation. 
 
104 See McKenna, supra note 21, at 1840–41 (claiming that the first goal of trademark law has 
always been focused on producers, not consumers, and tracing the history of trademark 
law); discussion supra Part I. 
105 See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 2:20, at 2-41 (“There is no doubt that good will, 
together with its symbol—the trademark—are legally classified as ‘property.’”). 
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1.  Counterarguments:  Trademarks as Primarily Public Goods and 
Efficiency-Promoting Devices 
Many share the belief that trademarks are primarily public, not 
private, goods.106  Roughly, the argument is that trademark rights con-
tain—in addition to rivalrous uses by owners—several non-rivalrous 
uses by consumers.107  Hence, a consumer may use a trademark and 
its related products in several ways without actually owning the mark.  
The basic premise of the argument is that the primary functions of 
trademarks are as consumer-driven, communicative devices.  Certain-
ly, one function of trademarks is to benefit consumers.  Trademarks 
reduce customer search costs and create reputational incentives for 
businesses to keep quality high.  However, the remainder of this Part 
explains that the private property-based functions of trademarks are 
now more dominant. 
Another related counterargument made by those involved in the 
law and economics movement108 is that the fundamental principles of 
trademark law—misappropriation of the trademark owner’s goodwill 
and deception of the consumer—are based in tort.  Therefore, some 
argue that “trademark law, like tort law in general . . . can best be ex-
plained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic 
efficiency.”109  Very roughly, the efficiency argument is that 
[b]y protecting established trademarks against confusing uses, trademark 
law aids consumers in their search for satisfactory goods and suppliers in 
their search for customers.  Too little protection obscures the signals that 
trademark users send to consumers and prevents consumers from find-
 
106 See, e.g., David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
22, 24 (2006) (arguing that, with or without legal protections, trademarks are non-
rivalrous public goods); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 
463 (1999) (arguing that without legal protections, trademarks are public goods). 
107 See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 106, at 64–65 (“The rivalrous proprietary uses are suppliers’ 
conflicting source-indicating uses that are likely to divert trade, cause confusion, and di-
lute the link between the trademark and the mark owner’s products or services.  The 
non-rivalrous referential and customary uses are by consumers, competitors, non-
competitors, and commentators who exploit the communicative value of the device with-
out using it as their own mark.”). 
108 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 6 (1972) (“As we shall see, 
many areas of the law, especially the great common law fields of property, torts, and con-
tracts, bear the stamp of economic reasoning.  Few legal opinions, to be sure, contain ex-
plicit references to economic concepts and few judges have a substantial background in 
economics.  But the true grounds of decision are often concealed rather than illuminat-
ed by the characteristic rhetoric of opinions.”).  To be clear, this author does not seek in 
any way to discredit the movement, but rather argues only that market efficiency is not 
today the principle agenda of the trademark regime. 
109 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:  An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987). 
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ing products that meet their needs.  Too much protection stifles compe-
tition.  It creates barriers to entry by denying competitors access to 
trademarked words and product features necessary to compete in the 
market.110 
While some courts and scholars are supportive of the efficiency ra-
tionale, this author respectfully disagrees that economic efficiency is 
today the major aim or result of trademarks—the reasons for which 
are discussed in the remainder of this Part.  Indeed, one scholar who 
advocates for a more limited function of trademark law has explained 
that “[u]nfortunately, the changes in trademark doctrine over the last 
fifty years are not supported by the new economic learning.”111 
2.  Trademarks are Distinct From Unfair Competition 
Trademark law’s close association with the tort of unfair competi-
tion is one reason why some view trademarks as related to torts and 
not property.  Yet trademark law derives from, but is not the same as, 
the tort of unfair competition.  There are no precise definitions of 
unfair competition, and the concept is vast.  Infringement and dilu-
tion of a trademark are forms of unfair competition.112  Other exam-
ples include such unrelated things as the misappropriation of busi-
ness values, “bait and switch” selling tactics, below-cost selling, and 
filing of baseless lawsuits.113  The point is that while trademarks are a 
form of the larger unfair competition regime, other entirely disparate 
concepts are considered forms of unfair competition as well.  Con-
versely, trademarks are not merely a subset of unfair competition 
(just as, say, the filing of a baseless lawsuit holds legal relevance be-
yond only unfair competition); the two are overlapping but—as the 
Supreme Court has explained—distinct concepts.114 
For example, an unfair competition provision contained in the 
Lanham Act is the false designation cause of action, which is concep-
tually separate from the property-based provisions of the Lanham 
Act.115  This is perhaps because the drafters of the Act wanted to cre-
ate, apart from a law of trademarks, a general federal law of unfair 
 
110 Barnes, supra note 106, at 49 (footnote omitted); see also Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lem-
ley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 788 (2004) 
(arguing that trademarks are “limited entitlements to protect against uses that diminish 
the informational value of marks”). 
111 Lemley, supra note 26, at 1688. 
112 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 1:10, at 1-25 to -29 (listing examples of unfair competi-
tion). 
113 See id. 
114 See infra Part II.A.5. 
115 See supra note 95. 
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competition.116  Consequently, a valid trademark registration is not 
required to invoke the Lanham Act’s false designation of origin pro-
vision. 
Indeed, a federal false designation of origin claim can proceed 
under the Act when two requirements are met:  (1) a “designation of 
origin” is used in interstate commerce in connection with goods or 
services, and (2) when such use is likely to “cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or asso-
ciation of [the defendant] with another person, or as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of [the defendant’s] goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person.”117  There is nothing relating to 
trademarks mentioned in the statutory language—this is a non-
trademark provision.118  Therefore, it is important to remember that 
the Lanham Act has property-focused trademark provisions (which 
are discussed later) and, separately, tort-like unfair competition provi-
sions. 
The state law of misappropriation is also distinct from the law of 
trademarks, despite a common association between the two.  It is said 
that misappropriation is, in fact, “really a penumbra or fringe of 
common law protection surrounding the outer boundaries of tradi-
tional federal patent or copyright protection.”119  The misappropria-
tion doctrine originated with the landmark case International News 
Service v. Associated Press.120  Its elements consist of (1) plaintiff making 
a substantial investment of time, money, and effort into appropriat-
ing a “thing” that resembles a property right; (2) defendant having 
appropriated the “thing” with little to no cost or effort of her own; 
and, (3) defendant having injured plaintiff by way of the misappro-
priation.121 
 
116 This is so because the drafters felt that the 1938 Supreme Court decision in Erie R.R. Co. 
v. Tompkins eliminated the existing unfair competition federal common law.  See 304 U.S. 
64, 78 (1938) (holding that the federal courts do not have the power to create federal 
common law). 
117 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
118 This does not mean, though, that one who has a valid trademark cannot pursue a false 
designation of origin claim.  It means only that ownership of a trademark is not necessary 
to pursue such a claim. 
119 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10:52, 
at 10-141 (4th ed. 2012). 
120 248 U.S. 215 (1918).  For an analysis of the legacy of this case, see Shyamkrishna Bal-
ganesh, “Hot News”:  The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 419 (2011).  
For a more recent example of the misappropriation doctrine, see NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 
105 F.3d 841, 847–54 (2d Cir. 1997). 
121 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 119, § 10:51, at 10-138 to -39 (listing the basic elements of the 
misappropriation doctrine). 
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No trademark is required for a misappropriation cause of action 
to proceed.  In fact, if a claimant possesses a trademark then an un-
fair competition claim is unnecessary since trademarks can be pro-
tected by filing an infringement or dilution cause of action.  Further, 
misappropriation may not be used in an infringement case as an ave-
nue to sidestep traditional trademark standards.122  As McCarthy states 
in regard to the distinction between trademarks and misappropria-
tion, “[t]rademark law was specifically constructed to balance the pri-
vate and public interests inherent in commercial symbols:  the unfair 
competition tort of ‘misappropriation’ was not.”123  Accordingly, there 
is no such thing as “misappropriation” of a trademark.124 
In sum, trademark law is distinct from the greater law of unfair 
competition, and the purpose of each differs greatly.  This is true 
even though the two areas do overlap at times. 
3.  Trademark Law’s Judicial History 
While trademark law’s expansion in the past half-century has so-
lidified trademarks as property rights, Mark McKenna and other 
scholars have noted that even early American trademark law cases fo-
cused on the protection of owners’ trademarks as property.125  Early 
American courts—as English common law courts had done—saw 
trademark jurisprudence as targeting illegitimate trade diversion.  
These courts focused on remedying the harm to producers (mark 
owners) more than harm to consumers.126 
Early examples of producer-focused opinions include the nine-
teenth-century cases Coats v. Holbrook, Partridge v. Menck, and Canal 
 
122 Id. § 10:51, at 10-140 (“[M]isappropriation cannot be used in an ordinary trademark in-
fringement case as a shortcut around traditional trademark law standards of protection 
and infringement.”). 
123 Id. § 10:72, at 10-190. 
124 See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech:  Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Ra-
tionales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 171 (1982) (arguing 
against the existence of trademark misappropriation). 
125 See McKenna, supra 21, at 1858 (explaining that American courts had the same focus on 
trademarks as English common law courts, “on the harm to a producer from improper 
diversion of its trade”); Adam Mossoff, What is Property?:  Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 
ARIZ L. REV. 371, 419–21 (2003) (noting that nineteenth-century American courts de-
fined and protected trademarks as property entitlements).  But see Dogan & Lemley, supra 
note 110, at 788–89 (“Trademark law . . . historically limited itself to preventing uses of 
marks that ‘defraud[ed] the public’ by confusing people into believing that an infringer’s 
goods were produced or sponsored by the trademark holder.” (footnote omitted) (alter-
ation in original)). 
126 For a more detailed analysis of how the history of trademark law and its property-based 
origins have evolved, see McKenna, supra note 21. 
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Co. v. Clark.  In Coats, it was held that a person may not imitate anoth-
er’s product, “thereby attract[ing] to himself the patronage that 
without such deceptive use of such names . . . would have inured to 
the benefit of that other person.”127  In Partridge, the court noted that 
when a person “appropriated to himself a particular label, or sign, or 
trade-mark,” he or she was “entitled to protection against any other 
person who attempt[ed] to pirate upon the[ir] good will.”128  In the 
Clark Supreme Court opinion, Justice Strong stated that “where rights 
to the exclusive use of a trade-mark are invaded, it is invariably held 
that the essence of the wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one 
manufacturer or vendor as those of another.”129 
Courts mentioned consumer protection as a rationale for trade-
mark protection too, though it was secondary.130  For example, in 
Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. v. Spear, the superior court noted that 
those guilty of unfair competition “commit[] a fraud upon the public 
and upon the true owner of the trade-mark.”131  But, the Court also 
noted—invoking a property-centered justification—that the mark 
owner “is robbed of the fruits of the reputation that he had success-
fully labored to earn.”132  Further, the Seventh Circuit held that “[t]he 
deception of the public naturally tends to injure the proprietor of a 
business by diverting his customers and depriving him of sales which 
otherwise he might have made.  This, rather than the protection of 
the public against imposition is the sound and true basis for the pri-
vate remedy.”133 
In sync with the producer-focused goals of early American trade-
mark law cases, courts were specific in defining trademarks as proper-
ty rights.  As early as 1868, a court recognized that “[i]f a man estab-
lishes a business and makes it valuable by his skill and attention, the 
good will of that business is recognized by the law as property.”134  A 
decade later in the Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court held that 
 
127 Coats v. Holbrook, 7 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 713, 717 (1845). 
128 Partridge v. Menck, 5 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 572, 574 (1847). 
129 Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 322 (1871). 
130 McKenna, supra note 21, at 1863–66; see also Mossoff, supra note 125, at 420 n.199 (ex-
plaining that “these consumer-oriented concerns . . . are not the principal goal the judg-
es sought to protect in recognizing a businessman’s trademark.”  Rather, the judges 
sought to protect primarily producers). 
131 Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. 599, 605–06 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1849) (emphasis add-
ed). 
132 Id. at 606. 
133 Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1912) 
(denying relief to the plaintiff against defendant’s use of the name Borden in regard to 
ice cream branding). 
134 Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 457 (1868). 
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“[t]he right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the 
goods or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the 
exclusion of use by all other persons, has been long recognized by 
the common law . . . . It is a property right.”135  In defining the right, 
the Court noted that “[a]t common law the exclusive right to [the 
trademark] grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption.”136  This 
requirement of use as a prerequisite to the entitlement is an aspect of 
trademark property which differentiates it from other intangible 
property rights.137 
The Supreme Court declared again in the 1916 case, Hanover Star 
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, that as “a protection [of] good will” and “in 
connection with an existing business,” “[c]ommon-law trademarks, 
and the right to their exclusive use, are, of course, to be classed 
among property rights.”138  The Court affirmed the lower court’s 
opinion, which stated that “[i]t is not the trade-mark, but the trade, 
the business reputation and good will, that is injured; and the proper-
ty or right in the trade is protected from injury by preventing a fraud-
doer from stealing the complainant’s trade by means of using the 
complainant’s ‘commercial signature.’”139 
The fact that courts considered trademark owners to have proper-
ty interests in the goodwill underlying their trademarks is perhaps 
most clearly illuminated in Washburn v. National Wall-Paper Co.  Here, 
the court stated 
There is nothing marvelous or mysterious about it.  When an individual 
or a firm or a corporation has gone on for an unbroken series of years 
conducting a particular business, and has been so scrupulous in fulfilling 
every obligation, so careful in maintaining the standard of goods dealt in, 
so absolutely honest and fair in all business dealings that customers of 
the concern have become convinced that their experience in the future 
will be as satisfactory as it has been in the past, while such customers’ 
good report of their own experience tends continually to bring new cus-
tomers to the same concern, there has been produced an element of val-
ue quite as important—in some cases, perhaps far more important—than 
the plant or machinery with which the business is carried on.  That it is 
property is abundantly settled by authority and, indeed, is not disputed.140 
 
135 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879). 
136 Id. at 94. 
137 See infra notes 171–76 and accompanying discussion. 
138 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 414 (1916), superseded by statute, 
Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1946), as recognized in Park ‘N Fly, 
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 200 (1985). 
139 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 F. 513, 516 (7th Cir. 1913) (quot-
ing The Collins Co. v. Brown, 3 K. & J. 423). 
140 Washburn v. Nat’l Wall-Paper Co., 81 F. 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1897). 
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Modern decisions, though still acknowledging trademark property 
rights, analyze the right differently.  This is puzzling because trade-
mark rights have broadened, and not lessened, in scope.  In uphold-
ing the sanctity of the trademark property right less graciously than 
older decisions had, the Second Circuit explained that “[t]here is no 
such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant 
to an established business or trade in connection with which the 
mark is employed.”141  Other recent decisions have been even harsh-
er.  In International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., the 
Ninth Circuit noted that “[a] trademark owner has a property right 
only insofar as it is necessary to prevent customer confusion as to who 
produced the goods and to facilitate differentiation of the trademark 
owner’s goods.”142  The Fifth Circuit agreed, explaining in Kentucky 
Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp. that property in a 
trademark is defined by likelihood of consumer confusion only.143  As 
this Comment explains in the next Subpart, though, trademark 
property rights are certainly more expansive than some modern deci-
sions indicate. 
4.  Trademark Law’s Expansion Under the Lanham Act 
The Lanham Act codified—and expanded upon—state common 
law doctrines.144  According to congressional reports leading up to the 
passage of the Lanham Act, its goals are not only “to protect the pub-
lic from deceit, [and] to foster fair competition,” but also to “secure 
to the business community the advantages of reputation and goodwill 
by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to 
those who have not.”145  Three developments—the doctrines of initial 
interest confusion (as related to trademark infringement analysis, di-
 
141 PaperCutter Inc. v. Fay’s Drug Co., 900 F.2d 558, 561 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Pirone v. 
MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1990)).  This description, while more skepti-
cal of the trademark as a property right than nineteenth-century courts’ descriptions, 
simply reiterates that trademarks are property in the underlying goodwill of a business or 
brand, as opposed to possessing inherent value in themselves. 
142 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980). 
143 549 F.2d 368, 388–89 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Our cases demonstrate unbroken insistence upon 
likelihood of confusion, and by doing so they reject any notion that a trademark is an 
owner’s ‘property’ to be protected irrespective of its role in the operation of our mar-
kets.”). 
144 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006) (prohibiting in commerce the use of “any repro-
duction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with 
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in 
connection” when “such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to de-
ceive”). 
145 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946). 
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lution, and incontestability)—are consistent with an expansive notion 
of trademark property rights.  Unlike the false-designation-of-origin 
cause of action mentioned earlier, infringement and dilution provi-
sions do require a registered trademark in order to launch a cause of 
action.146  Incontestability, the third area now considered, is a defense 
to trademark infringement.147 
The test for trademark infringement is whether a likelihood of 
consumer confusion exists regarding the relationship of the defend-
ant’s mark to the plaintiff’s mark.148  Several types of confusion are 
considered with regard to infringement and most, but not all, are 
consumer-centered.  The most widely recognized type of confusion is 
point-of-sale confusion.149  However, courts also consider post-sale 
confusion,150 reverse confusion,151 and now, initial interest confusion.  
The last is a controversial doctrine that allows an infringement claim 
to advance even in cases where consumers are initially confused, but 
where such confusion is only momentary and is alleviated by the time 
of purchase.152 
The doctrine of initial interest confusion is exemplary of the fact 
that trademark infringement law now serves to protect the owners’ 
property interests in their marks, in addition to defending against 
consumer confusion.  Citing initial interest confusion, courts have 
permitted infringement claims to proceed on the basis of a consumer 
being merely distracted, attracted to, or interested in a competitor’s 
product.153  In this way, the doctrine allows infringement even in the 
 
146 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
147 See id. § 1115(b). 
148 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992). 
149 Point of sale confusion occurs at the time of consumer purchase.  See 4 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:5, at 23-41 (4th 
ed. 2012). 
150 Post-sale confusion occurs “among those who see an infringing mark in use by an owner 
who were not confused at the time they bought the product.”  Id., § 23:5, at 23-41 to -42. 
151 Reverse confusion “occurs when the junior user’s advertising swamps the market and cus-
tomers are likely to be confused into thinking that the senior user’s goods or services are 
those of the junior user.”  Id., § 23:5, at 23-42. 
152 See id.; see also Rothman, supra note 21, at 108 (explaining that courts often use the initial 
interest confusion “to hold that defendants have committed trademark infringement 
even when no one is ever likely to be confused by the use of the trademark”). 
153 See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (involving initial interest confusion with internet search engine results); Mobil 
Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding oil trad-
ing company liable for infringing on Mobil Oil’s flying horse symbol because “Pegasus 
Petroleum would gain crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal.  For example, 
an oil trader might listen to a cold phone call from Pegasus Petroleum . . . when other-
wise he might not, because of the possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related to Mo-
bil.”); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 
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absence of true confusion.  Using confusion only as a pretext, initial 
interest confusion protects trademark owners’ goodwill by ensuring 
that attention is not diverted away from trademarked products.  Fur-
ther, this is true whether or not the distraction would have negatively 
affected the consumer.154  Essentially, initial interest confusion ex-
pands infringement doctrine beyond the confines of consumer pro-
tection and supports the conclusion that now even infringement—
the most fundamental of all trademark principles—serves to protect 
mark owners’ property interests beyond likelihood-of-confusion anal-
ysis. 
Dilution is another doctrine that enlarges the dimensions of 
trademark property rights.155  Dilution may occur either by “blurring” 
or by “tarnishment” of a “famous” mark.  Blurring is said to occur 
when a second mark’s use “obscures or mars” the association of a first 
mark with a particular source.156  Tarnishment occurs when a first us-
er’s mark is associated with a second user in a way that harms the rep-
utation of the first user’s mark.157 
As a full-fledged doctrine, dilution is a relatively new addition to 
both state and federal trademark law.158  The federal dilution statute 
was added to the Lanham Act in 1995, and about half the states now 
have dilution statutes.  Instead of protecting against confusion, dilu-
tion protects the “distinctive quality” of the trademark.159  In doing so, 
the doctrine suggests that trademarks have value apart from source 
 
1331, 1339 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that even in the absence of confusion, a customer 
might initially believe there was some relationship between plaintiff’s piano and defend-
ant’s piano). 
154 See MCCARTHY, supra note 149. 
155 The term “dilution” means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services, “regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely 
confusion, of competition” between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or 
“of actual economic injury.”  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
156 See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION:  FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 80 (2002) (discussing dilution by blurring). 
157 This association usually occurs either through the association of the mark with unwhole-
some activities, or by linking the mark with shoddy quality.  Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 
Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing dilution by tarnishment in the context of a 
parody involving the John Deere company “deer” logo); WELKOWITZ supra note 154, at 95 
(“Even in the absence of confusion, the association of the mark with unwholesome activi-
ty can linger in the public’s consciousness, leaving the viewer with residual, if undefined, 
bad feelings about the mark.”). 
158 Dilution was “relatively unused until 1980.”  WELKOWITZ, supra note 156, at 4.  However, 
cases using the language of dilution (in other words, an emphasis on the protection of 
the goodwill of the mark) can be found dating back to as early as the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  See McKenna, supra note 21, at 1840. 
159 See WELKOWITZ, supra note 156, at 5 (explaining the distinction between trademark dilu-
tion and trademark infringement). 
May 2013] TRADEMARK TAKINGS 1609 
 
identification.160  The concern underlying dilution is preventing 
brands from being “whittled away” by the existence of other uses of a 
mark.161 
Indeed, consumer confusion is not a requirement, nor is consum-
er protection an underlying policy goal of the dilution doctrine.  In-
stead, the doctrinal structure and normative considerations of dilu-
tion focus on the security of brand owners, or perhaps in the 
alternative, the prevention of free-riding off of an established 
brand.162  Therefore, dilution suggests that trademarks are mark-
holders’ property beyond the context of likelihood-of-confusion anal-
ysis. 
Another significant recent expansion of trademark law is that af-
ter five years of registration, a trademark can become “incontestable.”  
This allows the incontestable mark holder additional rights in her 
mark.163  An incontestable mark may no longer be legally challenged 
as to its validity, registration, or ownership.164  This doctrine can be 
interpreted—in addition to initial interest confusion and dilution—as 
further solidifying the owner’s right to exclude others because it bol-
sters the property exclusion right by allowing the mark holder added 
protections against interference by others. 
Other examples of the expansion of trademarks under the Lan-
ham Act include the enhancements of trade dress protection165 and 
 
160 Id. 
161 See id.  Under state dilution law, a mark must be shown to be distinctive in order for the 
mark’s owner to invoke the doctrine.  Under the Lanham Act, the mark must be not only 
distinctive, but also famous as measured by the general consuming population.  See id. at 
40–41 (discussing the distinction between merely famous versus distinctive and famous). 
162 The normative basis of dilution is unclear, though it is thought of as markholder, not 
consumer-centered.  See David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine:  Toward a Coherent 
Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 117 
(2004) (arguing that “while American dilution purports to be about preventing dilutive 
harm, it really is about preventing free-riding on famous marks”); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (2006) (arguing that dilution is focused on protection of 
producers, not consumers); Brian A. Jacobs, Note, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional 
Edge, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 162 (2004) (explaining that dilution “effectively grant[s] 
property-like right to famous trademark holders”); cf. Stacy L. Dogan, What Is Dilution, 
Anyway?, 105 MICH. L. REV. (FIRST IMPRESSIONS) 103 (2006), available at 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/what-is-dilution-anyway (arguing that dilu-
tion should be about the reduction of “consumer search costs” but acknowledging that 
“the dilution theory has evolved into a more complicated beast”). 
163 See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2006). 
164 See id. § 1115(h). 
165 Roughly, trade dress is the nonfunctional “look and feel” of a product or design.  Under 
the Lanham Act, trade dress is protectable without formal registration.  Trade dress regis-
tered on the principal register, however, gives a trade dress owner additional protections 
in the forms of constructive use, constructive notice, and incontestability.  See id. 
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Internet domain name “cybersquatting” as a form of trademark in-
fringement.166  In sum, all of these doctrines are representative of an 
expansive and property-focused trademark regime.  In fact, one 
scholar has noted that “[v]irtually every significant doctrinal [trade-
mark law] development in the last century has given mark owners 
greater control over the use and meaning of their marks.”167 
5.  Theoretical Considerations 
As previously mentioned in Part I, the right to exclude is the 
“hallmark” of any private property interest and the most important 
“stick” in the “bundle of rights.”  Trademarks are, by their nature, ex-
clusionary.168  In The Trade-Mark Cases, the Court described a trade-
mark as a right “to the exclusion of use by all other persons.”169  
Moreover, one federal appellate court recently explained that “[i]f 
the law will not protect one’s claim of right to exclude others from 
using an alleged trademark, then he does not own a ‘trademark,’ for 
that which all are free to use cannot be a trademark.”170 
In regard to the structure of the trademark property right more 
specifically, Professor Adam Mossoff argues that nineteenth-century 
judges were quick to label the trademark as a property right because, 
for these judges, “recognizing a property right in something first cre-
ated and used by someone was simply a matter of legally protecting 
that person’s entitlements.”171  The judges allude to the fact that 
trademarks meet the right-to-exclude criteria following a sufficient 
 
§ 1125(a)(3) (“[F]or trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who 
asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be pro-
tected is not functional.”); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 
(1992) (expanding trade dress protection by holding that trade dress that is inherently 
distinctive is protectable under the Lanham Act without showing that it has acquired sec-
ondary meaning). 
166 Cybersquatting grants to mark holders a cause of action against those who, with bad faith 
intent to profit, registers, traffics in, or uses an infringing domain name.  See 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d); see also uBID, Inc. v. The GoDaddy Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 434 (7th Cir. 
2010) (“The problem with cybersquatting websites is well-documented.  These websites 
and domain names do not exist for a legitimate purpose.  Instead, the owners wait for a 
company . . . to buy the infringing domain name, and in the meantime . . . their licensee 
helps siphon customers away . . . by drawing the typo-prone to . . . competitors.” (citation 
omitted)). 
167 McKenna, supra note 21, at 1915. 
168 In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501–02 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (“To say one 
has a ‘trademark’ implies ownership and ownership implies the right to exclude oth-
ers.”). 
169 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879). 
170 Deister Concentrator, 289 F.2d at 502 n.5. 
171 See Mossoff, supra note 125, at 421. 
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duration and magnitude of use (in commerce).  Mossoff, quoting the 
superior court in Spear, explains that the property 
right does not become established until the trade mark be so often used, 
and so long employed, exclusively and uninterruptedly, as to create the 
presumption that everybody would know and acknowledge, that it was 
the distinctive badge of the plaintiff’s ownership.172 
Here, the Spear court recognized that trademark use eventually leads 
to the exclusion right once a trademark is registered.173  Essentially, 
once the trademark use requirements are met, the right to exclude 
others comes into existence and a property right in the trademark is 
established. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that trademarks are exclu-
sionary in more recent opinions, too.  In Florida Prepaid, Justice Scalia 
explains that the Lanham Act’s false advertising provisions share no re-
lationship to the right to exclude.174  Justice Scalia, however, distin-
guishes the Lanham Act’s false advertising provisions from its trade-
mark provisions.  He explains that “[t]he Lanham Act may well 
contain provisions that protect constitutionally cognizable property 
interests—notably, its provisions dealing with infringement of trade-
marks, which are the ‘property’ of the owner because he can exclude 
others from using them.”175 
In this way, Justice Scalia acknowledges that trademarks are exclu-
sionary rights and—as discussed previously in Part II.A.2—
differentiates trademarks from the broader law of unfair competition, 
which the Court years earlier argued “has its roots in the common-law 
tort of deceit:  its general concern is with protecting consumers.”176  
Here, the Supreme Court acknowledges that the normative aims of 
trademark law are separate from unfair competition’s consumer-
protection rationale.  Indeed, trademarks satisfy the right to exclude 
because by registering a trademark, a brand owner is able to legally 
prevent any competitor from using the same or a similar mark for re-
lated goods or services.  The same cannot necessarily be said about 
the non-trademark, unfair competition provisions of the Lanham Act, 
 
172 Id. (quoting Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. 599 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1849)). 
173 See Mossoff, supra note 125, at 420 (“The concept of property underlying this assessment 
is clear:  the first person to use a mark in commerce gains entitlement to it as property, 
and thus may exclude others from using it thereafter.  First, use, and second, exclusion 
based on this use.”). 
174 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 
(1999) (“The hallmark of a constitutionally protected property interest is the right to ex-
clude others . . . .  The Lanham Act’s false-advertising provisions . . . bear no relationship 
to any right to exclude.”). 
175 Id. 
176 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989). 
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of which the invocation of a cause of action does not require a 
trademark. 
John Locke’s labor theory, while perhaps less academically repu-
table than the right-to-exclude property theory, also justifies trade-
mark property rights.  Roughly, Locke’s theory declares that one has 
a right to property in one’s “own person” and in “the labor of [one’s] 
body.”177  This standard is satisfied in the trademark context by the 
time and labor that a business owner expends when establishing his 
or her brand.  Locke’s labor theory is exemplified particularly by the 
trademark use requirement, which states that in order to acquire a 
trademark (and by extension a property right in the goodwill under-
lying it), an owner needs first to make significant use of the mark for 
a period of time.178 
6.  Assignment and Perpetual Lifecycle of the Trademark 
Like tangible property, trademarks may be transferred in myriad 
ways.  Trademarks are assignable;179 they can be bought, sold, or li-
censed.180  The assignment-in-gross doctrine—reflected in the lan-
guage of the Lanham Act’s § 1060—provides that the goodwill of the 
trademark must be sold with the trademark itself so as to avoid an il-
legal “assignment in gross.”181  Accordingly, a trademark transfer is 
only legal when it is reassigned along with the business interest asso-
ciated with it.182  Therefore, because trademark property has no value 
apart from the goodwill of the trademark, in order for the transfer to 
be deemed valid, care must be taken to ensure that such goodwill is 
 
177 See Sudakshina Sen, Fluency of the Flesh:  Perils of an Expanding Right of Publicity, 59 ALB. L. 
REV. 739, 739–40 (1995) (discussing Locke’s labor theory of property as a possible justifi-
cation for the right of publicity). 
178 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2006) (mandating “use in commerce” for a trademark to be reg-
istered).  Or else, the owner must file an intent-to-use application, and follow through by 
actually using the trademark.  See id. § 1051(b) (2006) (“A person who has a bona fide in-
tention, under circumstances showing the good faith of such person, to use a trademark 
in commerce may request registration of its trademark . . . .”). 
179 An “assignment” of a mark is a total sale of all rights in that mark.  See id. § 1060 (estab-
lishing the process by which a trademark may be assigned). 
180 See id. (permitting the transfer of registered marks and outlining the transfer proce-
dures); see also 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 18:1, at 18-5 (4th ed. 2012) (“Trademarks are regarded as ‘property.’  
Thus, marks, like any kind of property, can be bought, sold and licensed.”). 
181 See 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (“A registered mark . . . shall be assignable with the good will of the 
business in which the mark is used, or with that part of the good will of the business con-
nected with the use of and symbolized by the mark.”). 
182 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 180, § 18:2, at 18-6 (4th ed. 2012) (“Good will and its trademark 
symbol are as inseparable as Siamese Twins who cannot be separated without death to 
both.”). 
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not lost.183  The assignment-in-gross rule reinforces the notion that 
trademarks are property—they can be bought, sold, and traded.  
Moreover, the rule illustrates that trademarks are property in the 
goodwill of a business, as assignments must contain the goodwill asso-
ciated with the mark.  The assignment-in-gross rule, in sum, illustrates 
that:  (1) trademarks are analogous to physical forms of property in 
their ability to be severed, and (2) a mark and its goodwill are insepa-
rable. 
Also consistent with tangible property, trademarks are everlasting, 
if properly maintained.  The life cycle of a trademark is perpetual, 
provided that renewal applications are timely filed.184  Therefore, like 
most private property rights, but unlike patents or copyrights, a mark 
owner can expect to keep a trademark indefinitely. 
7.  Trademark Property Rights as Symbolic of Goodwill 
Trademarks are intangible property symbolizing the goodwill of a 
brand.185  Goodwill is intangible, non-physical, and often valued as a 
company asset.186  Goodwill is defined as “buyer momentum,”187 the 
“going concern value” of a business,188 or the “expectancy of contin-
ued patronage” from consumers.189  Basically, it is encompassed in the 
idea that buyers who find a product acceptable will tend to continue 
buying it in the future rather than “shop around” for a competitor’s 
product.190 
 
183 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 2:20, at 2-42 (“If there is no business and no good will, a 
trademark symbolizes nothing.”). 
184 See 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a) (providing that “each registration may be renewed for periods of 
10 years at the end of each successive 10-year period following the date of registration”). 
185 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 2:20, at 2-41 (citing Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-
Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 194–95 (1936); Cont’l Distilling Sales Co. v. Brancato, 173 
F.2d 296, 298 (8th Cir. 1949); Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 
201 F. 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1912); Metro. Nat’l Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 36 F. 722, 
724 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1888), aff’d, 149 U.S. 436 (1893); Hunt v. Phinney, 2 Cal. Rptr. 57, 59 
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Dutcher v. Harker, 377 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); 
Freeling v. Wood, 361 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Okla. 1961); Floyd A. Wright, The Nature and Ba-
sis of Good Will, 24 ILL. L. REV. 20, 21 n.4, 22 nn.5–11 (1929)). 
186 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 2:21, at 2-44. 
187 See id. § 2:18, at 2-40.6. 
188 See id. § 2:19, at 2-41. 
189 See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555–56 (1993) (“[T]he 
shorthand description of goodwill as ‘the expectancy of continued patron-
age,’ . . . provides a useful label with which to identify the total of all the imponderable 
qualities that attract customers to the business.” (internal citation omitted)). 
190 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 2:20, at 2-42 (“One who buys good will in effect buys the 
prospect of the continued patronage of satisfied buyers.”). 
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Scholars have conceptualized—but mostly rejected—other formu-
lations of the trademark property right.191  These theorizations in-
clude (1) the idea that “the right to a mark was merely incidental to 
rights in physical property,” or (2) “that trademarks themselves are 
protected as property.”192  Neither, however, is satisfactory.  The for-
mer “does not sufficiently account for the fact that courts rarely men-
tioned physical assets when they articulated the harm of trademark 
infringement[,] . . . instead focusing on mark owner’s patronage.”193  
The latter is also problematic, though some think it is gaining trac-
tion due to the prolific expansion of trademark doctrine.194  As men-
tioned in the discussion of assignment, trademarks and their goodwill 
are intertwined; trademarks alone scarcely have financial worth.  Fur-
ther, as mentioned in the discussion of trademarks’ judicial history, 
courts have long regarded trademarks as property in goodwill.  Con-
sequently, for at least the purposes of constitutional property analysis, 
trademarks are best viewed as property symbolizing the underlying 
value of brands’ reputation and value. 
B.  Trademarks are Constitutional Property 
This Subpart first discusses the facts of two seminal intangible tak-
ings cases.  It then argues that trademarks meet the criteria for consti-
tutional property required by the courts in these cases.  Finally, this 
Subpart applies trademarks to Professor Merrill’s theoretical constitu-
tional property requirements. 
1.  Judicial Precedent 
The Supreme Court has held that trade secrets are protected un-
der the Takings Clause.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit explained, on the other hand, that patents are not protected.  
These decisions highlight many of the factors that the courts look to 
when deciding whether an intangible property right is constitutional 
property.  Courts will likely apply this precedent to the trademark tak-
ings issue. 
 
191 See, e.g., McKenna, supra note 21, at 1881–86 (discussing three possible conceptualiza-
tions of trademark property rights). 
192 Id. at 1881. 
193 Id. 
194 See Lemley, supra note 26, at 1687–88 (“Commentators and even courts increasingly talk 
about trademarks as property rights; as things valuable in and of themselves, rather than 
for the product goodwill they embody[,] . . . [a]nd they are well on their way to divorcing 
trademarks entirely from the goods they are supposed to represent.”). 
May 2013] TRADEMARK TAKINGS 1615 
 
a.  Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
A pesticide producer, Monsanto Company, brought suit against 
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) for relief under the 
data consideration and disclosure provisions of the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”), which mandated 
disclosure of the producer’s pesticide formulas.195  The pesticide pro-
ducer alleged, among other causes of action,196 a taking of property 
without compensation by the EPA.  On direct appeal, the Supreme 
Court held that the pesticide producer had a property interest pro-
tected by the Takings Clause “in the health, safety, and environmen-
tal data it had submitted to the EPA,” data which the Supreme Court 
categorized as trade secrets.197 
First, the Court noted that intangible property rights created by 
state law deserve the protection of the Takings Clause.198  The Court 
explained that trade secrets have many of the characteristics of tangi-
ble property forms—including the ability to be assigned.199  It was also 
discussed that Congress, in the FIFRA amendments, noted that de-
velopers had a “proprietary interest” in trade secret data, and there-
fore data submitters are entitled to compensation because they “have 
legal ownership of the data.”200  Further, the Court—invoking Locke’s 
labor theory—held that intangibles like trade secrets as well as tangi-
ble objects might be products of “labour and invention.”201  Finally, it 
was explained that the Court has a long history of giving protection 
under the Takings Clause to intangible property rights that were cre-
ated by state law, including trade secrets.202 
 
195 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991 (1984) (discussing FIFRA’s history 
and disclosure requirements). 
196 Violation of due process and unconstitutional delegation of judicial power are the other 
causes of action alleged by Monsanto.  Id. at 999. 
197 Id. at 1000, 1013; see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (defining a trade 
secret as “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in 
one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competi-
tors who do not know or use it”). 
198 See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003–04 (finding “[t]hat intangible property rights protected by 
state law are deserving of the protection of the Taking Clause has long been implicit in 
the thinking of this Court”). 
199 Id. at 1002. 
200 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
201 Id. at 1002–03 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *405; JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A 
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 14–23 (J.W. Gough ed., 1946)). 
202 Monsanto, 476 U.S. at 1003. 
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b.  Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III) 
Zoltek Corporation claimed that the United States and a company 
hired by the United States committed patent infringement that 
amounted to a taking because the manufacturer’s subcontractors 
used Zoltek’s patented silicide fiber products when building F-22 
fighter aircrafts.203  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in-
voked the Supreme Court case of Schillinger v. United States.  In Schil-
linger, the Court rejected the argument that a patent owner could sue 
the government for patent infringement as a taking under the Tuck-
er Act.204 
The Federal Circuit explained that constitutional property inter-
ests for purposes of the Takings Clause must arise out of “an inde-
pendent source such as state law.”205  The court noted that patents do 
not meet this requirement because they are “a creature of federal 
law.”206 
The court also cited Congress’s intention that patents should not 
be protected under the Fifth Amendment, explaining that 
[i]n response to Schillinger, Congress provided a specific sovereign im-
munity waiver for a patentee to recover for infringement by the govern-
ment.  Had Congress intended to clarify the dimensions of the patent 
rights as property interests under the Fifth Amendment, there would 
have been no need for the new and limited sovereign immunity waiver.  
The manner in which Congress responded to Schillinger is significant.  
“The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”  Neither 
the Court of Federal Claims nor this court can ignore the path of the pa-
tent law as it has evolved under § 1498.207 
2. Judicial Guidelines 
First, trademark law—despite its codification under the federal 
Lanham Act—remains largely a creature of state common law.208  
 
203 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam), reh’g en 
banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 
1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
204 Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350; see also Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006) (permitting certain 
claims to be brought against the United States). 
205 Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1352. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. (footnote omitted). 
208 See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal Trademark Legislation 
and the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 79–80 (1996) (ex-
plaining that “the Lanham Act codifies the basic common law principles governing both 
the subject matter and scope of [trademark] protection”); Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitima-
cy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV. 519, 520 (1993) (arguing that the goal of 
the Lanham Act was to codify, not to expand, trademark common law). 
May 2013] TRADEMARK TAKINGS 1617 
 
While patents and copyrights are granted power under the Federal 
Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause,209 trademarks are given 
federal power by way of the Commerce Clause.  In the 1879 Trade-
Mark Cases, the Supreme Court denied Congress the authority under 
the Intellectual Property Clause to register or regulate trademarks.210  
Today, federal trademark jurisdiction is limited to trademarks used in 
interstate and foreign commerce.211  Accordingly, trademarks can be 
distinguished from federally created patents.212  The federal creation 
of patents is mentioned in Zoltek as a chief reason that patents are not 
today considered constitutional property.213  Trademarks, on the oth-
er hand, meet the state law creation requirement for constitutional 
property because they are products of the common law. 
Second, as previously discussed, trademarks’ nineteenth-century 
history supports the fact that trademarks were then too considered 
property rights.214  There is no ruling to the contrary that would serve 
as a procedural bar such as in the patent context with the Zoltek 
court’s reliance on Schillinger.215 
Third, theoretically, trademarks can be seen as constitutional 
property.  Trademarks, again, meet the right-to-exclude theorization 
of property that is the hallmark of constitutional property.  Further, 
the extensive use requirements necessary in order to obtain a trade-
mark registration, as well as the effort put forth in the creation of a 
mark, serve to satisfy the Lockean “labour and invention” conception 
of property noted in Monsanto. 
Fourth, trademarks constitute the mark owners’ reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations of exclusive use and exclusion rights.  
Whereas trade secrets constitute investment-backed expectations in 
 
209 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
210 See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879) (explaining that trademarks are 
distinct from either patents or copyrights). 
211 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 180, §§ 19:103 to :122, at 19-315 to -59, §§ 25:53 to 25:56, at 
25-178 to -85 (“Up to this present day, federal jurisdiction over trademarks generally ex-
tends only to marks used in interstate and foreign commerce.”  1 McCarthy, supra note 
21, § 6:2). 
212 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress power “[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
213 See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) 
(holding that patents rights do not constitute property interests under the Takings 
Clause because patents are “a creature of federal law”), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
214 See supra Part II.A.3. 
215 See supra note 203–07 and accompanying discussion. 
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only certain circumstances according to Monsanto,216 it is difficult to 
imagine a context in which a lack of investment-backed expectations 
of trademark owners would prohibit protection under the Takings 
Clause.  When an individual owns a business and registers a trade-
mark, by using and registering the mark, the owner will always have 
an expectation to the exclusive name and goodwill of her or his mark 
and brand.  The existence of trademarks for a non-finite amount of 
time further supports the existence of owners’ reasonable investment-
backed expectations because owners usually expect ownership of 
their marks for lengthy durations of time, and register marks with no 
other intention than to profit from reputation and goodwill. 
Fifth, trademarks are, to review, assignable and perpetual in dura-
tion.  It was explained in Monsanto that because trade secrets are akin 
to tangible property rights in several ways—assignment being one 
particular way—trade secrets were, among other reasons, held to be 
constitutionally protected.217  Trademarks, like trade secrets and many 
forms of tangible property, are assignable.218  Further, while patents 
and copyrights have limited legal lives, trademarks, once registered, 
may exist into perpetuity provided that they are renewed timely and 
continue to be used in commerce.219 
3.  Normative Dimensions 
As briefly mentioned in Part I, Thomas Merrill’s theoretical con-
stitutional property dimensions consist of  (1) an irrevocable right; 
(2) a discrete asset; (3) and the right to exclude.220  Having previously 
established that trademarks satisfy the right to exclude, this Comment 
now explains that trademarks consist of discrete assets and constitute 
irrevocable rights.  While courts have not invoked these requirements 
directly when deciding intangible takings cases, their evaluation will 
serve to further define the scope of the trademark property right as 
the sort of property that ought to be protected under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
 
216 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005–07 (1984) (applying the investment-
backed expectations factor to the trade secret disclosure at issue). 
217 See id. at 1002 (“Trade secrets have many of the characteristics of more tangible forms of 
property.  A trade secret is assignable.”). 
218 See supra notes 179–83. 
219 See supra note 184 and accompanying discussion. 
220 See Merrill, supra note 63, at 969 (outlining “a more complete federal patterning defini-
tion of takings property”). 
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a.  Discrete Asset 
By discrete asset, Merrill refers to 
[A] valued resource that (1) is held by the claimant in a legally recog-
nized property form (for example, a fee simple, a lease, an easement, 
and so forth), and (2) is created, exchanged or enforced by economic ac-
tors with enough frequency to be recognized as a distinct asset in the rel-
evant community.  An incident of property, in contrast, is a power or 
privilege that belongs to one who holds property, but is not itself a legally 
recognized form of property.221 
Moreover, the discrete asset requirement complements the right to 
exclude.  It “tells us what it is the owner has a right to exclude others 
from; the right to exclude tells us why this particular resource can be 
identified as something that is owned, as opposed to being just 
‘stuff.’”222 
It appears at first that this requirement runs counter to the 
trademark as property argument.  A trademark property right—
symbolic of the underlying goodwill of a business—does not immedi-
ately appear discrete.  To review, goodwill is defined nondescriptly as 
the going concern value of a business, buyer momentum, or the ex-
pectancy of continued patronage.223  Indeed, Merrill gives as an ex-
ample of a non-discrete asset “[T]he bottom line of a balance 
sheet.”224  Goodwill is often defined as that exact bottom line. 
The property right at issue, though, is not defined merely as 
goodwill.  Instead, it is defined as the trademark symbolizing the under-
lying goodwill or value of a business.225  Therefore, the trademark it-
self along with its goodwill—not merely the underlying goodwill—
should be seen as a discrete asset.  To apply trademarks to Merrill’s 
two discrete property criteria, the (1) “valued resource” is goodwill 
put into a discrete property form (the trademark).  Further, (2) 
trademarks are “created, exchanged or enforced by economic actors” 
because only businesses register, maintain, and enforce their marks.  
 
221 Id. at 974.  To illustrate, Merrill gives two examples.  Merrill mentions the case of Hodel v. 
Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), in which he claims that the right to inherit is an incident and 
not a discrete asset.  The discrete assets, Merrill notes, “were the interests in tribal lands 
that either would or would not be inherited.”  Merrill, supra note 63, at 974–75.  His se-
cond example involves the case of Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), where the 
property taking in question involved an easement.  Merrill explains that “[e]asements are 
a recognized form of property and are created, exchanged, and enforced as distinct as-
sets.”  Merrill, supra note 63, at 975. 
222 Merrill, supra note 63, at 975. 
223 See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying discussion. 
224 Merrill, supra note 63, at 977 (“One cannot ‘take’ the bottom line of a balance sheet.”). 
225 See supra, Part II.A.7. 
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Accordingly, trademarks should be seen as discrete assets, even if the 
underlying goodwill that they represent is not, by itself, discrete. 
b.  Irrevocable Right 
Professor Merrill explains: 
Takings property must be “vested” in roughly the same sense that a 
common-law property right is vested and a mere license is not.  Basically, 
takings property must be irrevocable for a predetermined period of time, 
and there must be no understanding, explicit or implicit, that the legisla-
ture has reserved the right to terminate the interest before this period of 
time elapses.226 
Further, Merrill states that the irrevocable requirement “does not 
mean, of course, that [the property right] must be a fee simple abso-
lute or otherwise have an indefinite duration.  It simply means that 
the right is not subject to discretionary revocation for some prede-
termined period of time.”227 
Trademarks meet the “irrevocable” requirement.  As long as a 
trademark remains in use, it will not be revoked provided that it is 
timely renewed each ten-year period.  Moreover, a trademark right is 
perpetual in duration—it is not subject to discretionary revocation 
for any predetermined period of time unless the registration lapses 
from disuse.  Thus, ownership of a trademark should be seen as an 
irrevocable right. 
IV.  TRADEMARK TAKINGS 
This final Part discusses potential applications and obstacles in re-
gard to a trademark takings doctrine.  Finally, this Comment con-
cludes by analyzing possible examples of trademark per se takings, 
regulatory takings, and judicial takings. 
 
226 Merrill, supra note 63, at 978. 
227 Id. at 979.  As examples of revocable rights, Merrill discusses Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654 (1981), and United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 
(1943).  In Regan, “President Carter seized Iranian assets in response to the embassy hos-
tage crisis, [and] he issued orders that authorized Americans with claims against Iran to 
obtain licenses allowing attachments of Iranian assets.  Later, when a diplomatic solution 
to the crisis was reached, the President issued orders nullifying all such attachments.”  
Merrill, supra note 63, at 978.  The Court held that because the licenses were revocable at 
any time, “‘petitioner did not acquire any ‘property’ interest in its attachments of the sort 
that would support a constitutional claim for compensation.’”  Id.  In Powelson, the Court 
concluded that delegated power of eminent domain by the state is not a compensable 
property right because it can be revoked at any point in time.  Id. at 979. 
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A.  Doctrinal Obstacles 
This Subpart examines potential trademark takings obstacles.  
First, it discusses the measurement of “just compensation” in the in-
tangible trademark takings context.  Second, it examines the issue of 
“public use.”  This Comment claims that the difficulties inherent in 
the application of intangible trademark property rights to takings ju-
risprudence, while formidable, should not be prohibitive to the estab-
lishment of a trademark takings doctrine. 
1.  Measurement of “Just Compensation” 
An issue with regard to trademark takings—and intangible takings 
more generally—is how to measure “just compensation.”228  While 
“just compensation” can be defined as “what the owner has lost,”229 it 
is not as simple to gauge the value of an intangible trademark proper-
ty right as it is with real property or personal property.  This is espe-
cially true in the case of infringement or dilution that is continually 
occurring.  At least partially for this reason, injunctive relief—instead 
of damages—is usually applied as a remedy in trademark suits.230  
However, the Takings Clause demands fiscal “just compensation”—
because the goal of takings law is to impose on the government a fi-
nancial cost for the taking of property, not to enjoin it from doing so. 
“Just compensation” is often determined by the fair market value 
of the property at issue.  However, courts have held that fair market 
value should not be used to determine “just compensation” when the 
fair market standard is too difficult to ascertain.231  In United States v. 
Cors, the Supreme Court explained that there is no formula for 
measuring “just compensation.”  The Court stated that the Fifth 
Amendment 
 
228 For a thorough account of the origins and history of the “just compensation” require-
ment, see William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985) (noting that compensa-
tion was not always a requirement in takings jurisprudence). 
229 Gackstetter v. State, 618 P.2d 564, 566 (Alaska 1980). 
230 See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988) (“In-
junctive relief is the remedy of choice for trademark and unfair competition cases, since 
there is no adequate remedy at law for the injury caused by the defendant’s continuing 
infringement.  It is the remedy provided by federal and state trademark infringement 
statutes.”). 
231 Gackstetter, 618 P.2d at 567 (“Fair market value is usually equated with just compensation, 
as it provides an objective standard by which to measure the loss to the owner.  Neverthe-
less, . . . fair market value is not the end in itself, but merely a means to achieve the goal 
of just compensation.” (footnote omitted)). 
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does not contain any definite standards of fairness by which the measure 
of “just compensation” is to be determined.  The Court in an endeavor to 
find working rules that will do substantial justice has adopted practical 
standards, including that of market value.  But it has refused to make a 
fetish even of market value, since it may not be the best measure of value 
in some cases.232 
It is for the courts to determine how to correctly measure “just 
compensation” in the context of trademark takings.  Sophisticated 
trademark valuation techniques have been developed that can be 
used to determine the worth of a trademark, and a number of com-
panies specialize in the valuation of brands and trademarks.233  While 
determining the value of continuing infringement or dilution is still 
problematic, trademark valuation services may be used in trademark 
takings cases as a starting point.  Thus, the obstacles involved in 
measuring the value of “just compensation” in trademarks cases are 
challenging, but likely not insurmountable. 
2.  Determination of “Public Use” 
Determining “public use” is perhaps a less thorny issue than 
measuring “just compensation.”  A public use will be found when a 
taking has at least some “conceivable public character.”234  When a 
trademark is appropriated or interfered with in a meaningful way, 
such government use likely will be considered to be for a public use 
or purpose. 
For example, consider again the FDA regulation scenario men-
tioned in the Introduction to this Comment.235  The public purpose 
can be interpreted as the children’s health benefits that would, po-
 
232 United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949) (internal citations omitted). 
233 Economic and mathematical methods are used commonly to assess the true value of a 
brand.  Some models examine the price amount for the sale of similar brands in the 
marketplace.  Others estimate like profits from direct sales, license fees, or other revenue 
over a certain time period.  See GORDON V. SMITH, TRADEMARK VALUATION (1997) (offer-
ing a comprehensive description of various trademark valuation topics); Fact Sheet:  As-
signments, Licenses and Valuation, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, 
http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/BrandValuation. aspx (last vis-
ited Nov. 1, 2012) (noting that “[a] number of companies specialize in the valuation of 
brands and trademarks”). 
234 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“This Court has declared that a taking should be upheld as consistent with the Public 
Use Clause as long as it is ‘rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.’” (internal 
citations omitted)); see also Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244–45 (1984) (ex-
plaining that although a “purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the 
public use requirement[,]” courts are very deferential to the legislature in the determina-
tion of whether a taking will serve a public use). 
235 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying discussion. 
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tentially, stem from this regulation.  And, with regard to the “Greatest 
Snow on Earth” scenario also mentioned in the Introduction,236 the 
public purpose might be the promotion of the Olympic Games—no 
doubt of pressing economic and reputational importance for the U.S. 
government. 
The public use requirement, after the Kelo decision, is sufficiently 
broad to encompass most government trademark appropriations.237  
Therefore, it is likely that federal government interference with 
trademark rights would amount to a taking unless it involved a com-
pletely private transfer—a rare scenario.  Of course, as with any tak-
ing, the government must compensate mark owners for the interfer-
ence with their trademark property rights. 
B.  Doctrinal Applications 
The theoretical conception of the trademark as a property right in 
the underlying goodwill of a business separates trademark law norma-
tively from patents and copyrights.  Patents and copyrights are for in-
ventions and ideas, respectively.  There is no use requirement neces-
sary to apply for a patent, and copyrights are created instantaneously, 
as soon as the requirements of originality and fixation are met.238  
With regard to patents, Professor Mossoff explains that 
[A] patent is nonrivalrous and nonexhaustive in nature.  The govern-
ment’s unauthorized use of a patented invention, therefore, lacks the 
physical dispossession that triggers a compensable taking of land.  From the 
perspective of land-based takings doctrine, the government’s unauthor-
ized use of a patented invention does not interfere with a patentee’s own 
use of the invention, and, more importantly, the patentee can continue 
to exclude others from using it.239 
Here, Mossoff illustrates that a patentee is not entitled to injunc-
tive relief in the case of a patent taking because government use does 
not implicate the patent exclusion right.  A patentee can continue ex-
cluding others even following the government’s unauthorized use. 
While government use of others’ patents may amount only to reg-
ulatory takings, government use of private trademarks can be more 
easily analogized to per se takings.  This is because the government, 
 
236 See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying discussion. 
237 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485 (noting that courts have employed a “traditionally broad under-
standing of public purpose”). 
238 Copyrights need, however, to be registered in order to gain additional protections.  See 
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2006) (declaring that certain actions for in-
fringement shall not be brought until “preregistration or registration of the copyright 
claim has been made in accordance with this title”). 
239 Mossoff, supra note 15, at 721. 
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by engaging in direct use or regulation of a trademark, is impeding 
directly on the goodwill of a business—the very heart of the trade-
mark property right.  It is impossible to divorce a trademark from the 
brand value that it symbolizes.  Moreover, government interference 
with a trademark in any meaningful way will affect a business’s bot-
tom line. 
While profits are in many cases affected with regard to a patent 
taking as well, interference with an invention is more subjective than 
interference with the value of a brand.  A trademark, as a commodi-
ty—and perhaps unlike many patented inventions—is “rivalrous” and 
“exhaustive.”  The goodwill inherent in brand name goods or services 
is rivalrous because of brand competition,240 and is exhaustive because 
the consumer base is finite within any given economic market.  Con-
sequently, because of the unique nature of the trademark property 
right, unauthorized use of a mark by anyone other than the owner 
appears to more often interfere with not only the use right, but also 
the right to exclude. 
As such, courts may analogize trademark takings to per se takings, 
while patents would—if considered protectable under the Takings 
Clause—instead more likely effect regulatory takings.  The reason, in 
sum, is because per se takings implicate both the use and exclusion 
rights, while regulatory takings infringe only upon use rights.241  This 
Comment now discusses potential examples of per se, regulatory, and 
judicial takings of trademarks with this consideration in mind. 
1.  Trademark Per Se Takings 
Courts have found per se takings when either (1) a physical gov-
ernmental appropriation of property for its own use occurs; or, (2) a 
regulation constituting a complete deprivation of all use or value of 
property is found.242  Therefore, by analogy, a trademark per se taking 
might occur if (1) the government physically appropriates a mark for 
itself; or, (2) the government regulation in question amounts to a 
complete deprivation of a business’s goodwill. 
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Supreme 
Court held that a law mandating the installation of electronic cables 
 
240 See Barnes, supra note 106, at 23 (“Private goods are rivalrous.”). 
241 See Mossoff, supra note 15, at 721; Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Prop-
erty, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1161, 1163 n.5 (2000) (“The Court has long held that interference 
with the right to exclude others is close to a per se taking of property.” (citing Dolan v. 
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 
831 (1987)). 
242 See discussion supra Part I.A.1. 
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in apartments amounted to a taking.243  The Court noted that a prop-
erty owner suffers harm when her property is occupied.244  Although 
the electronic cables occupied only a small area, the Court noted that 
the size of the occupied area is no factor in the determination of 
whether an occupation of property constitutes a per se taking.245  A 
permanent, physical occupation of property is held to be more severe 
than a regulation.246  This is because, as mentioned in the previous 
Subpart, the right to exclude—in addition to the use right—is violat-
ed in the case of a per se taking.247 
A physical trademark taking is one where the government does 
not simply impose regulations on a trademark owner, but instead ac-
tually appropriates the trademark for its own use.  The “Greatest 
Snow on Earth” scenario in this Comment’s Introduction is a sound 
example of this because while the government use does not deprive 
the owner of all the value of its trademark, the government itself uses 
a variation on the trademarked slogan at issue.248 
Another type of per se trademark taking involves a regulation that 
amounts to a complete deprivation of a trademark’s value.  For ex-
ample, imagine that the federal government informed the Washing-
ton Redskins football team that it could no longer use the “Redskins” 
name or logo at all, citing reasons of racial insensitivity against Native 
Americans due to the derogatory nature of the mark.249  Although this 
taking is only a regulation—the government is not itself using the 
mark as it was in the preceding example—it prevents the football 
team from using the mark completely.  Therefore, the regulation im-
poses on the franchise a total loss of trademark value and appears, 
therefore, to be a per se taking. 
A conceptual difficulty arises in this situation, though, because an 
intangible property right is at issue.  As such, the “physical” character-
ization of a trademark taking is perhaps by analogy only.  As men-
 
243 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corps., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). 
244 See id. at 436. 
245 See id. at 441. 
246 See id. at 426–27. 
247 See supra note 241. 
248 See supra notes 2–4, and accompanying discussion. 
249 This is based on an ongoing controversy between Native Americans advocacy groups and 
the National Football League over the Redskins name.  For example, see Petition for 
Cancellation, Blackhorse v. Pro Football Inc., Cancellation No. 92/046,185 (T.T.A.B. 
2006), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/redskins.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2013) (arguing that the franchises’ “federally registered marks con-
sist of or comprise matter that disparages Native American person, and brings them into 
contempt, ridicule, and disrepute, in violation of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1052(a)”). 
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tioned previously, the structure of the trademark property right, de-
spite its intangible nature, strengthens the case for the per se takings 
analogy because the exclusion right and the use right are closely 
bound in the trademark property right structure—per se takings im-
plicate the use and exclusion rights, whereas regulatory takings only 
implicate the use right.250  Applying this reasoning to the Redskins ex-
ample, the goodwill of the football franchise’s brand is destroyed if 
the mark is taken.  Considering that goodwill is the entire basis of the 
property right, it seems that a total taking of this goodwill should 
amount to a per se taking.  But, as was exemplified in Monsanto, there 
is still doubt regarding whether courts will ever regularly consider the 
taking of an intangible trademark property right to be a true per se 
taking. 
2.  Trademark Regulatory Takings 
Government regulations restrict certain uses of property but are 
less intrusive than physical occupations since physical occupations 
not only restrict use of the property but also affect mark owners’ 
rights to possess or exclude.  Courts have in the past been inclined to 
regard intangible takings as regulatory takings.251 
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court held that where a government 
action interferes with an owner’s use or enjoyment of property, the 
Court considers three factors in balancing the government interest 
with the owner’s property right:  (1) the character of the government 
action, (2) the government action’s economic impact, and (3) its in-
terference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.252  In 
Monsanto, the mandatory disclosure of trade secrets was held to be a 
regulatory taking, not a per se taking, despite the fact that the trade 
secret formula was physically given to the government.  The Court 
analogized the disclosure of trade secrets to a regulatory taking and 
stated that “[t]he economic value of that property right lies in the 
competitive advantage over others that Monsanto enjoys by virtue of 
its exclusive access to the data, and disclosure or use by others of the 
data would destroy that competitive edge.”253 
 
250 See Volokh, supra note 241. 
251 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984) (holding that because Mon-
santo’s competitive advantage was lost as a result of a regulation, this effects a regulatory 
taking, but not a per se taking). 
252 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
253 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1012. 
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As for trademarks, the competitive advantage may be framed as 
the mark’s recognition among its owner’s customers—which is lost as 
a result of certain government regulations.  This loss of competitive 
advantage may be illustrated by returning to the FDA regulation sce-
nario mentioned in the Introduction to this Comment.254  In this ex-
ample, the FDA’s proposal prohibits products from being marketed 
to children unless strict nutritional requirements are met.  This has 
the effect of restricting product packaging and use of characters such 
as Kellogg’s mascot, Tony the Tiger.  While the case could be made 
that the regulation amounts to a per se taking—perhaps by imposing 
regulations that Kellogg’s cannot realistically meet, the FDA actually 
takes Kellogg’s entire property right and the mark is lost complete-
ly—it can also be considered a regulatory taking because the gov-
ernment proposal harms Kellogg’s competitive advantage.  Here, Kel-
logg’s brand recognition has been lessened following its loss of the 
mascot.  This has, of course, a negative impact on the company’s 
economic vitality.  Further, Kellogg has investment-backed expecta-
tions in the Tony the Tiger mark, exemplified by the amount of 
money and time the company spent developing, implementing, and 
using the mascot. 
3.  Trademark Judicial Takings 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Stop the Beach lays the framework 
for a judicial takings doctrine.255  In Stop the Beach, owners of beach-
front property unsuccessfully challenged Florida’s Beach and Shore 
Preservation Act, which granted a permit to restore miles of eroded 
beaches.256  This regulation resulted in the state obtaining title to any 
new dry land created along the modified waterline—the “mean high 
water line.”257  Therefore, beachfront property owners brought suit, 
alleging they had been deprived of their land ownership along the 
mean high water line.258  The property owners claimed that the state 
acquisition of land along the mean high water line amounted to a 
taking without compensation.259  The Florida Supreme Court held 
that state water laws never gave the property owners the right to own 
 
254 See supra notes 5–6, and accompanying discussion. 
255 See Somin, supra note 58, at 94 (citing Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010)). 
256 See id. at 93. 
257 See id. 
258 See id. 
259 See id. 
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the property up to the mean high water line created by the project.260  
Following the Florida Supreme Court opinion, the beachfront owners 
appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.  They argued that 
the Florida Supreme Court decision constituted a taking because it 
allegedly contradicted Florida’s established water law principles and 
thus unjustly deprived the owners of their land.261 
While the Supreme Court affirmed, ruling against the beachfront 
landowners in Stop the Beach, it acknowledged that a judicial taking 
could exist under alternate fact scenarios.  Consequently, a potential 
avenue for trademark (and other intangible) takings to present 
themselves without compensation measuring difficulties is through 
the doctrine of judicial takings.  Indeed, Justice Scalia remarked that 
due to the unique nature of a judicial taking, such a taking may be 
remedied simply by invalidating the offending decision.262 
Consider the following example:  A state appellate court holds, in 
the “Greatest Snow on Earth” scenario in this Comment’s Introduc-
tion,263 that no dilution to Ringling Bros.’ mark occurred as a result of 
the government’s use of their trademarked phrase.  The appellate 
court therefore dismisses the action.  The U.S. Supreme Court takes 
up the case, overturns the state appellate court opinion, holds that 
dilution is in fact occurring, and declares the appellate court ruling 
to be a taking of Ringling Bros.’ trademark property. 
Under a judicial takings doctrine, if broadly construed, the appel-
late court’s opinion amounts to a taking of the trademark property 
interest.  The logic is that by not preventing the trademark dilution 
that was occurring, and interpreting the Lanham Act incorrectly, the 
appellate court decision serves as the mechanism that leads to the con-
tinuing loss of trademark value.  The reversal of a holding may satisfy 
the “just compensation” part of the Takings Clause, because unlike 
per se and regulatory takings where monetary compensation is re-
quired, invalidation of the offending decision is all that is necessary 
in the judicial takings construct.  Therefore, judicial takings might 
amount to a form of federal judicial review over state court decision-
 
260 See id. 
261 See id. 
262 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2607 
(2010) (explaining that no monetary compensation is required because “[i]f we were to 
hold that the Florida Supreme Court had effected an uncompensated taking in the pre-
sent case[,] . . . [w]e would simply reverse the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment that the 
Beach and Shore Preservation Act can be applied to the property in question”). 
263 See supra notes 3–4, and accompanying discussion. 
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making.  This is merely speculation, however, as the scope and objec-
tives of the doctrine remain unclear.264 
V.  CONCLUSION 
An intellectual property regime caught between two competing 
aims—the rights of mark owners and the protection of consumers—
trademarks now amount to unique private property interests in the 
value of brand-name goods and services.  Certainly, many fear that 
the “propertization” of trademarks breeds monopolies.265  This argu-
ment is not without merit and, on a practical level, perhaps aspects of 
trademark law should be reined in.  However, the history, doctrines, 
and aims of trademark law support the claim that trademarks are cur-
rently legal private property.  In addition, trademarks now possess the 
qualities necessary for constitutional protection.  For these reasons, 
the existing trademark regime is subject to the Takings Clause.  The 
realization that trademarks amount to constitutional property exem-
plifies the present broad scope of trademark law, and sheds addition-
al light on the issue of intangible takings. 
Difficulties exist, though, in determining how takings law should 
apply in the trademarks construct.  These problems include facilitat-
ing a measurement of “just compensation,” deciding what constitutes 
a taking in the context of a property right symbolic of goodwill, and 
relating trademarks jurisprudence to the takings framework.  Such 
concerns should not prohibit the application of the Fifth Amend-
ment to trademarks, however.  Indeed, courts and scholars should 
endeavor to fashion workable solutions to the trademark takings issue 
so as to bring clarity to this muddling area of the law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
264 See supra note 58 and accompanying discussion. 
265 See supra note 26. 
